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ABSTRACT
Copyright, at international, European and national levels, does not provide
a legal framework that prioritizes enabling and incentivizing research using
protected works and information to the extent necessary and desirable in a
digital, data-driven society in order to build a sustainable ecosystem for
innovation and creativity. While small progress has been made, for example
with the recent introduction of specific exceptions for research purposes and
for text and data mining in certain national legislations as well as in the
European Union law, a horizontal approach towards a more researchfriendly copyright ecosystem has so far failed to evolve. By revisiting
international and European human and fundamental rights instruments as
well as the aims and objectives of the European Union, it is possible to distill
research as a constitutional and ethical imperative. Conceptualizing a
fundamental ‘Right to Research’ and integrating it into a constitutional
dialogue provides a convincing argument to rethink copyright towards a
research-oriented normative system.
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INTRODUCTION
Whether a global pandemic, regional food shortages and famines, or
escalating political conflicts and outright wars, the global problems of the
present and the future require a rethinking of the way modern societies
manage scarce resources, distribute wealth, and engage with each other.
Solutions to present and future challenges necessitate innovative and
sustainable approaches, which will require investment in research, but more
importantly free places and spaces to think, develop and innovate. Freedom
to research is key to ensure that future generations are able to exercise and
enjoy the same, or at least similar opportunities that recent and present
generations have enjoyed over the last decades. In other words, to ensure that
coming generations are able to live in dignity and prosperity requires
significant efforts at multiple levels to ensure that current societies move
towards a more sustainable way of living and exploitation of this planet’s
resources.
To face the challenges of the present in earnest and with seriousness is an
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obligation towards future generations. Solutions for these challenges require
investment in, but also the removal of barriers for research. Many modern
research activities, especially research that involves large amounts of data,
requires access to information, its processing, storage and analysis. 1
Restricting access to data can create insurmountable barriers to research,
especially in the form of property rights over data. 2 Therefore,
conceptualizing a ‘Right to Research’, as a right for individuals, but also as
an intergenerational right which creates obligations, is a necessary foundation
for a more sustainable future. While such a right can be conceived very
broadly, this article illustrates the necessity of such a right to research in
copyright law. However, a right to research fully developed in this specific
context will inevitably also create implications for other intellectual property
rights, expose the tensions between intellectual property law, policy and
human rights, 3 but also other fields of the law, such as competition law.
The purpose of copyright is to incentivize creativity that drives cultural
and social progress. 4 This is sometimes difficult to reconcile with copyright’s

1

See for Example the OECD Principles and Guidelines for Access to Research Data
from Public Funding (2007), available at: https://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/38500813.pdf:
“The power of computers and the Internet has created new fields of application for not only
the results of research, but the sources of research: the base material of research data.
Moreover, research data, in digital form, are increasingly being used in research endeavours
beyond the original project for which they were gathered, in other research fields and in
industry.” Underlining the effects of improving access to data to diversify and democratize
science: Abhishek Nagaraj, Esther Shears & Mathijs de Vaan, Improving data access
democratizes and diversifies science, 117 PNAS 23490 (2020) see also on the importance of
access to data: Martin Senftleben, STUDY ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS AND ACCESS
AND REUSE OF DATA (Study for DGRTD, 14 June 2022).
2
See for example policy considerations on a right for data producers in the EU:
Commission, Staff Working Document on the free flow of data and emerging issues of the
European data economy, Brussels 10.01.2017, SWD(2017) 2 final; Commission, Europe
2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, Brussels 3.3.2020, COM(2010)
2020 final, p. 5, 33-36; see critically on such a right: Ivan Stepanov, Introducing a property
right over data in the EU: the data producer’s right – an evaluation, 34 IRLCT 65 (2020).
But also events such as the COVID-19 pandemic can make access to information difficult
and underlines the importance of research-friendly access policies, see Marilena Vecco et
al., THE IMPACT OF THE COVID-10 PANDEMIC ON CREATIVE INDUSTRIES, CULTURAL
INSTITUTIONS, EDUCATION AND RESEARCH (Study for WIPO, 2022).
3
Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971–1020 (2007); LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE (2011)
and the various contributions in CHRISTOPHE GEIGER, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015) and PAUL TORREMANS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2020). More critical, see See only Ruth L. Okediji,
Does Intellectual Property Need Human Rights?, 51 N.Y.U. J. INT’L & POL. 1, (2018).
4
See only Christophe Geiger, Copyright as an access right: Securing cultural
participation through the protection of creators’ interests, in WHAT IF WE COULD REIMAGINE
COPYRIGHT? 73, 74-76 (Rebecca Giblin & Kimberlee Weatherall eds., 2017); Christophe
Geiger, Copyright and free access to information: for a fair balance of interests in a
globalised world, 28 E.I.P.R. 366, 367 (2006); Jenny Lynn Sheridan, Copyright’s
Knowledge Principle, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 39, 49-55 (2014), see also in this sense
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exclusivity paradigm that allows to control access to and reuse of copyrighted
works by several means, such as a set of exclusive (veto) rights and
technological barriers or other automated protection measures. 5 Exclusivity
as copyright’s main paradigm 6 has resulted in broad interpretations of
exclusive rights, 7 extensions of copyright terms 8 and, especially in Europe,
in a narrow interpretation of exceptions and limitations. To counter these
tendencies, reconceptualizing copyright in its relation to research activities
can provide powerful arguments for substantive changes in copyright law that
reflect research as a paradigm that complements, or possibly replaces the
exclusivity paradigm. 9
Therefore, a right to research can create constitutional imperatives for a
research-enabling copyright framework, in order to achieve policy goals that
include sustainability and intergenerational justice. Such a right has its roots
in a balanced reading of the relevant international human rights instruments.
However, as all intellectual property rights, copyright is territorial in nature,
and is therefore dressed in national customs and traditions. For that reason,
regard must also be had to regional codifications of fundamental rights, even
if they tend to be inspired by the universality of human rights. 10 In the
Ruth Okediji, The Limits of International Copyright Exceptions for Developing Countries,
21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 689 (2019), arguing for a rethinking of copyright exceptions at
international level to foster human development.
5
See in this sense Jane C. Ginsburg, Essay – How Copyright Got a Bad Name For Itself,
26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61, 61 (2003).
6
Nicolas Suzor, Access, Progress, and Fairness: Rethinking Exclusivity in Copyright,
15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 297, 302 (2013)
7
For the EU, see for example the interpretation of the CJEU of the reproduction right in
CJEU, Judgment 19 July 2009 Infopaq I, C-5/08, EU:C:2009:465 and the constantly
expanding construction of the right to communication to the public (see for a critical
summary João Pedro Quintais, Untangling the hyperlinking web: In search of the online
right of communication to the public, 21 JWILP 385 (2018)).
8
In the US, the term of copyright was extended in 1998 to 70 years post mortem auctoris
(Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)),
see critically Richard Epstein, A., The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term
Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123 (2002); in the EU, the Term Directive (Directive
2006/116/EC on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, [2006] OJ L
372/12) harmonizes the term of protection for literary and artistic works, which the directive
sets at 70 years after the death of the authors. This extends the term of protection 20 years
beyond that required under Article 7 of the Berne Convention. Widespread opposition to a
longer term of protection, but also criticism as to the current long term of protection was
revealed by a 2013 Consultation on the Review of EU Copyright Rules (see the 2014 Report,
available under: https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=60517).
9
For a critical analysis of the exclusivity paradigm in copyright law, see already
Christophe Geiger, Promoting Creativity through Copyright Limitations, Reflections on the
Concept of Exclusivity in Copyright Law”, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 515 (2010).
10
See for example CJEU, Judgment of 14 October 2004 Omega, C-36/92,
EU:C:2004:614, para. 33: “It should be recalled in that context that, according to settled caselaw, fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law the observance
of which the Court ensures, and that, for that purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by
international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have
GEIGER/JÜTTE

5

CONCEPTUALIZING A RIGHT TO RESEARCH

European Union (EU), as a developed and highly integrated regional
constitutional order, the contours of a right to research can already be traced
in law and in policy.
The aim of this contribution is to conceptualize and sketch a right to
research as an argument and a structural element in a constitutional dialogue
that will lead to a rethinking of the balance within copyright law. Currently,
copyright rules create barriers for research activities. 11 Especially in datadriven, digital societies and economies access to information for research
purposes is essential. The wide reach of copyright makes lawful access to
such information difficult, either because of the gatekeeper function of holder
of exclusive rights, or because of high transaction costs.
While international human right instruments suggest a balanced approach
to scientific progress and the protection of the rights of authors, modern
copyright law does not reflect this delicate equilibrium. It is therefore
suggested that copyright law must be adapted to take into account that
research is amongst the rationales for providing copyright protection.
For that purpose, it is necessary, even indispensable, to consider the
constitutional foundations of European copyright law against the background
of international human rights obligations and commitments of the EU and its
Member States. From these sources, we set out to distil the essence of a
European right to research and demonstrate, to the extent possible with a
sketch of a ‘new’ fundamental right, how copyright should or must be
(re)interpreted and normatively adapted to reflect the rights of researchers,
but also of society at large, to access and use information that is hidden behind
the walls of copyright’s exclusive rights.
First, we lay out the relevant international and European human rights
and fundamental rights framework that contains, as we argue, the elements
of a right to research. We will briefly examine fundamental rights in the EU
as part of a more complex normative and policy framework. Having laid the
foundation for our analysis, we discuss in detail the fundamental rights that
contain elements that, taken together and developed further, form our concept
of a right to research. We then argue why and how this ‘new’ individual right
can and indeed should be integrated in existing fundamental rights
instruments. In a final step, we demonstrate how a fundamental right to
research should be relied on to argue for changes in existing copyright rules
with the objective to create a robust and innovation-friendly copyright
framework that serves to tackle the challenges of the present and future
collaborated or to which they are signatories. The European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms has special significance in that respect.” The CJEU recognizes
the special status of human dignity in the German constitution (para. 34), which is however,
a value shared by all the Member States of the European Union. However, the special status
of human dignity in the German constitutional order justifies a derogation form the freedom
to provide services.
11
Cf. the extensive study conducted by Senftleben (n 1), identifying a variety of
copyright barriers in European copyright law (Section 3)
WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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towards a more sustainable European and global society, before summarizing
and concluding.
The Fundamental and Human Rights Foundations for the Right to Research
A right to research that secures access to works protected by copyright
for research purposes is not expressly contained in international human rights
documents or the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In this section, we highlight the
relevant provisions of international human rights law which refer to the
protection of authors in a specific systematic context. This analysis suggests
that the international human rights framework does not mandate restrictive
national copyright laws that hinder research activities. Furthermore, we
examine the European fundamental rights system and demonstrate that the
elements and contours of a right to research are already present therein. Read
together, several provisions of this European fundamental rights system
provide a solid foundation for a right to research that can, even must, inspire
a research-friendly reform of copyright’s central elements. Moreover, we
posit that identifying and expressing the existence of a right to research,
which we develop subsequently, is a constitutional imperative against the
background of the aims and objectives of the EU. We also argue that for this
right, which exists in a variety of isolated provisions, to take full effect, the
right requires express recognition and pronunciation as an independent right,
or at least as a right that is expressly integrated into existing constitutional
guarantees.
A. A Fundamental Right to Research rooted in international human
rights law
International human rights law contains important indications as to how
the interests of authors should systematically interact with access to the
benefits of science, artistic creation, or any other creative activity for that
purpose. In this section, we examine the relevant international human rights
instruments which contain references and guidance for the interaction
between the rights of authors and those of users of protected works. We will
illustrate that the international human rights framework does not constitute a
barrier to a more research-friendly copyright system, but instead suggests a
balanced approach that provides protection for authors only for specific
purposes linked with the development of science and culture, which is closely
connected to research. In fact, it can be argued that international human rights
already include the seeds of a research-oriented copyright system.
1. Freedom of Expression and information
The right to freedom of expression has an extremely broad scope, at
international as well as European level. While its protection is fairly well
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developed in relation to journalistic activities and the media in general, 12 as
well as political participation, 13 its relevance for research outside these
categories 14 remains largely underexplored. 15 The UN Human Rights
Committee’s 2022 General comment No. 34 mentions ‘researchers’ only
once in relation to treason laws. 16 It is incompatible with Article 19(3) ICCPR
to invoke such laws “to suppress or withhold from the public information of
legitimate public interest that does not harm national security or to prosecute
journalists, researchers, environmental activists, human rights defenders, or
others, for having disseminated such information”, or to include within the
scope of such laws information “relating to the commercial sector, banking
and scientific progress.” A 2013 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of expression and opinion
on the right to access to information also fails to mention research activities
as a privileged area in which freedom of expression should receive special
consideration. 17
Researchers and research activities enjoy some privileges, or some
elevated level of protection as compared to ‘ordinary’ people. The General
comment privileges researchers only in relation to the dissemination of
information. 18 However, access to certain information is also necessary to
safeguard efficient and unobstructed research. The General comment
discusses a right to access to information held by public bodies, which it
derives directly from Article 19(2) ICCPR. 19 In combination with Article 25
ICCPR, which grants certain participatory rights in democratic processes, the
press and other media enjoy a right to access information on public affairs, to

12
The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of
opinion and expression in its annual report to the UN General Assembly and in statements
delivered to the UN Human Rights Council regularly comments on the situation of journalists
in a variety of contexts, see for example the Reports of the Special Rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression A/HRC/20/17,
A/HRC/14/23, A/HRC/11/4.
13
General Assembly (2018) Draft guidelines for States on the effective implementation
of the right to participate in public affairs, A/HRC/39/28.
14
In fact, it can easily be argued that journalist are a category of researchers and medias
in general provide research activities when documenting themselves and using these
information to inform the public.
15
Only one of the relevant reports dealt expressly with academic freedom, General
Assembly (2020) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the
right to freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye, A/75/261, which refers to
intellectual property as a potential limitation for academics to cooperate globally (para. 49).
16
Human Rights Committee. (2011) General comment No 34. Article 19: Freedoms of
opinion and expression, CCPR/C/GC/34 [hereinafter ‘General comment No. 34’], para. 30;
in this context the Committee warns that laws “relating to national security are in strict
complicate with paragraph 3 of Article 19 ICCPR, which determines the conditions under
which restrictions to Article 19 are permitted.
17
General Assembly (2013) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 68th Session, A/68/362.
18
General comment No. 34, para. 30.
19
General comment No. 34, para. 18.
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inform critical debate and to enable citizen engagement. Not as a right but
rather as a recommendation, to enable access to information in the public
interest, the General comment suggests that Governments should make
information in the public interests available in the public domain. 20 This
could be understood to require that information of such a nature should not
enjoy copyright protection in the first place and that a monopolistic position
granted under intellectual property law could not be used to restrict access to
or even to suppress information. In the absence of open accessibility, access
to information mechanisms should be put in place. 21
Missing from the current interpretation is a right to access information for
research purposes held and controlled by private parties. Privileges similar to
those enjoyed by journalists would help to lay a stronger human rights
foundation for researchers to access and work with information. The
necessity to extend such privileges can arise from the growing urgency at
global level to support research activities indispensable for developing
sustainably solutions that are necessary to realize other fundamental rights
and goals of the international community.
2. The right to share in scientific advancement and its benefits and the
authors’ moral and material interests
The ‘right to science’, 22 as it also referred to, dates back to the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 23 and has been reelaborated in the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 24 However, it has only attracted increased
scholarly attention over the last three decades, 25 and its realization is lagging
20

General comment No. 34, para. 19.
General comment No. 34, para. 19.
22
See for on overview of other sources of the ‘right to science’: Anna-Maria Huber, The
Human Right to Science and Its Relationship to International Environmental Law, 31 EJIL
625–656, 628-629 (2020), , on the evolution of both provisions see AURORA PLOMER,
PATENTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO SCIENCE (2015), Chapters 3 and 4.
23
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217
A(III) (UDHR).
24
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16
December 1966 UNGA Res 2200 A (XXI) (ICESCR), UNTS vol. 993, p. 3.
25
See for example Audrey R. Chapman, Towards an Understanding of the Right to
Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its Applications, 8 Journal of Human Rights 1
(2009); Klaus D. Beiter, Terence Karran & Kwado Appiagyei-Atua, Yearning to Belong;
Finding a “Home” for the Right to Acadmic Freedom in the U.N. Human Rights Covenants,
11 INTERCULT. HUM. RIGHTS LAW REV. (2016); Klaus D. Beiter, Where Have All the
Scientific and Academic Freedoms Gone? And What Is ‘Adequate for Science’? The Right
to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its Applications, 52 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW
233 (2019); Sebastian Porsdam Mann, Helle Porsdam & Yvonne Donders, “Sleeping
Beauty”: The Right to Science as a Global Ethical Discourse, 42 HUMAN RIGHTS
QUARTERLY 332 (2020); Effy Vayena & John Tasioulas, “We the Scientists”: a Human
Right to Citizen Science, 28 PHILOS. TECHNOL. 479 (2015), see from an intellectual property
perspective: Helfer, supra (n 3) [Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual
Property], 975-977, 987 et seq.; specifically on the right of authors Hans Morten Haugen,
21
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behind its ambitious scope. 26 The right to share in the benefits of scientific
advancement is rooted in the idea that science and its discoveries can advance
humanity and create benefits for society and individual wellbeing. 27
However, the precise scope has remained obscure for a long time during
which it has been neglected by academic commentators. 28 Only with the 2005
General Comment No. 17 on the right of everyone to benefit from the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author, 29 and the 2009
Venice Statement on the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress 30
and its applications did the debate on the contours of this right begin properly.
The UDHR states in the first paragraph of Article 27 that “[e]veryone has
the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy
the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.” The second
paragraph continues by providing that “[e]veryone has the right to the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production of which he is the author.“ The two statements
can be read to be contradictory, the first to guarantee free access to
productions of the cultural, scientific and artistic domain, the second to
guarantee the authors of these productions rewards in terms of protection and
remuneration for their efforts, and effective control over their use. This
seeming contradiction stems from contemporary understanding of
intellectual property rights as exclusive rights that grant monopolistic
positions in relation to cultural and scientific outputs. Instead, they can also
be seen as a “balanced framework” that reconciles copyright’s natural law
and utilitarian foundations. 31
The ICESCR includes a similar commitment made by its signatories to
General Comment No. 17 on ‘‘Authors’ Rights’’, 10 JWIP 53 (2007) and on the interface
with IP, see Christophe Geiger (ed.), INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO SCIENCE
AND CULTURE: CONVERGENCE OR CONFLICT?, CEIPI/ ICTSD publication series on “Global
Perspectives and Challenges for the Intellectual Property System” (Christophe Geiger, ed.,
2016).
26
Cf. Porsdam Mann et al., supra (n 25), 340, with reference to Right to Science,
American
Association
for
the
Advancement
of
Science
(n.d.),
https://www.aaas.org/article15.
27
Cf. Chapman, supra (n 25), 2; Jeffrey H. Toney et al., Science and Human Rights: A
Bridge Towards Benefiting Humanity, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 1008 (2010).
28
Cf. Chapman, supra (n 25), 1; Porsdam Mann et al., supra (n 25), 344.
29
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. (2005) General Comment No.
17. The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests
Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of which he or she is the
author. E.C.12/GC/17.
30
UNESCO, Experts’ Meeting on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress
and Its Application, Venice, Italy, July 16– 17, 2009, Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy
the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its Applications [hereinafter ‘The Venice Statement’],
para. 10.
31
Christophe Geiger, Reconceptualizing the Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual
Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 117, 130-131 (Paul L.C.
Torremans ed., 2020).
WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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guarantee three separate rights. Splitting the first paragraph of Article 27
UDHR, the Covenant first recognizes the right “[t]o take part in cultural life”,
second “[t]o enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications”,32
and third “[t]o benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the
author.” 33 These broad notions are complemented with more concrete
instructions for the State parties to realize these rights. While still very
general, these instructions set out aims that must be achieved at national, and
implicitly also at international level. According to the second, third and fourth
paragraph, State parties must ensure that the necessary steps are taken to
conserve, develop and diffuse culture and science, 34 that they “respect the
freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity” 35 and that
they recognize, and also encourage and develop international contacts and
co-operation in science and culture. 36
Intellectual property is regularly cited as a potential hindrance to the
realization of the ‘right to science’. 37 The proliferation of restrictive
intellectual property norms, most prominently by the 1994 Agreement on the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 38 has
contributed to a perception of intellectual property as a monopolistic
system. 39

32
33

ICESCR, art. 15(a) and (b).
ICESCR, art. 15(1)(c); see in general on the provision: Beiter et al., supra (n 25), 163

ff.
34

ICESCR, art. 15(2).
ICESCR, art. 15(3).
36
ICESCR, art. 15(4).
37
Chapman, supra (n 25), 28-29; Vayena & Tasioulas, supra (n 25), 483-484.
38
Special Rapporteur, The Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its
Applications, U.N. ESCOC, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/26 (2012)
[hereafter Report on Right to Science], para. 56: “Concern has been widely expressed about
the conflict between the right to science and intellectual property rights, in particular since
the adoption of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS). Bilateral and/or regional trade and investment agreements containing
“TRIPS plus” provisions or restricting TRIPS flexibilities can also pose problems. The
potential of intellectual property regimes to obstruct new technological solutions to critical
human problems such as food, water, health, chemical safety, energy and climate change
requires attention.” (references omitted).
39
However, it has been stressed that the TRIPs Agreement itself contains express
objectives that make intellectual property protection subject to the condition that they
“contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of the producers and users of
technological knowledge (Article 7), and that WTO members can adopt measures to “protect
public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance
to their socio-economic and technological development” (Article 8(1). Christophe Geiger
and Luc Desaunettes, The Revitalisation of the Object and Purpose of the TRIPS Agreement,
The Plain Packaging Reports and the Awakening of the TRIPS Flexibility Clauses, in
GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AND NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 267
(Jonathan Griffiths and Tuomas Mylly eds., 2021). Abuses of intellectual property rights
may be addressed by “[a]ppropriate measures” to ensure the “international transfer of
35
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To ensure the realization of these rights, to respect them and to recognize
the benefits of international cooperation, regard must be had to other
fundamental rights included in both instruments. This might be one of the
reasons why the ‘right to science’ has largely been neglected until recently.
There are indeed other fundamental rights that are indispensable for building
a framework for various facets of the ‘right to science’. 40 These rights include
the freedom of thought, 41 the right to freedom of expression, 42 association,43
the right to move freely across borders; 44 and the right to academic freedom. 45
Limitations on these rights, and others, would effectively constitute
limitations on the rights listed in Article 27 UDHR and Article 15(1)
ICESCR. 46 On the other side, the right to benefit from the progress of science,
and technology is also a condition for the realization and enjoyment of these
other rights. 47
In both instruments, the two rights are separated in different paragraphs
or subparagraphs, but they appear in a specific context. 48 This gives reason
to argue that both rights are systematically linked and therefore interrelated
and complimentary, 49 which is to say that neither of them is absolute nor that
technology” (Article 8(2); cf. Myra Tawfik, International Copyright Law, Access to
Knowledge, and Social Justice, in MOBILITIES, KNOWLEDGE, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 300, 315
(Suzan Ilcan ed., 2013).
40
Report on Right to Science, para. 18.
41
UDHR, art. 18.
42
ICCPR, art. 19(2).
43
ICCPR, art. 23, UDHR, art. 20.
44
ICCPR, art. 12; UDHR art. 13.
45
This right is not formally included in either the UDHR or the ICSCR, or any other
international human rights instrument for that purpose. However, there exists a growing body
of literature that conceptualizes this right: Beiter et al., supra (n 25) ; Beiter, supra (n 25) .
46
Chapman, supra (n 25) , 17.
47
Porsdam Mann et al., supra (n 25), 346-347; Peter K. Yu, Challenges to the
Development of a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 89, 116 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2020), 116.
48
See on the drafting history of Article 27 UDHR: Aurora Plomer, The Human Rights
Paradox: Intellectual Property Rights and Rights of Access to Science, 35 HUM. RTS. Q. 143,
160-175 (2013) 160-175; reviewing the negotiating positions of the different state parties,
Plomer concludes that the right granted to individuals under Article 27(2) (2) are meant to
protect “personal, creative abilities, and capacities of individual human beings” and can
therefore “only be claimed by, individual human beings rather than entities such as
commercial organizations or limited companies.” This also means that these rights must not
necessarily protected by intellectual property rights, and that the guarantee under Article
27(2) is not “coextensive” with the protection provided by intellectual property. More
importantly, the individuals rights granted under the provisions “should not cut across the
public good of facilitating access to knowledge, culture, and science, whether for liberal,
utilitarian, or communitarian reasons“ and that “national and international IP and patent laws
may certainly, and indeed, should be deployed to the service of human rights.”; see also
Porsdam Mann et al., supra (n 25) , 335-339.
49
See for example Christophe Geiger, Implementing Intellectual Property Provisions in
Human Rights Instruments: Towards a New Social Contract for the Protection of
Intangibles, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
661 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015), see also Chapman, supra (n 25) , 5, the author traces the
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they necessarily limit each other. It is therefore without doubt that the
realization of both rights creates tensions, which have not been resolved
within Article 15 ICESCR or Article 27 UDHR, 50 and most commentators
have lamented the failure to resolve this conflict with concrete guidance. 51
We will examine both rights in turn to extract their respective essences and
relate them to copyright.
The right to share in scientific advancement and its benefits
While Article 27 UDHR exhausts itself in ‘juxtaposing’ a collective right
of participation and enjoyment with an individual right to protection of moral
and material interests, Article 15 ICESCR provides more detailed, though
still rather abstract instructions on how this immanent normative conflict
should be resolved. Furthermore, considering Article 15 in its context, the
reading of other provisions of the ICSCR promotes an interpretation of
Article 15(b) that suggests that the results of scientific advancement should
be shared amongst the people of the world. Article 2(1) obliges signatories to
“take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures”. 52 The parties to the
Covenant agree to provide each other, in order to achieve the rights set out
therein, with technical assistance. 53 Such a provision of assistance, the
sharing of expertise and knowledge, of processes and equipment necessarily
requires the sharing of information, much of it will be protected by copyright.
In terms of its substance, the right refers to ‘scientific advancement’ and
its ‘benefits’, both notions define and potentially qualify the right. However,
neither of them has been authoritatively defined. A traditional post-war
understanding of scientific advancement, which has influenced the drafting
of both provisions, conceptualizes science as a progressive undertaking,
distinguishing it from arts and culture through an objective and determinative
nature. 54 In this understanding, the notion is characterized by “a collective
enterprise of researchers in successive generations” which produce “methods
of science […] that are used to create scientific theories, which are then tested

development of the negotiations that led to the ultimate text of Article 25 UDHR and Article
15(1) ICESCR
50
Porsdam Mann et al., supra (n 25) , 339, see further Helfer & Austin, supra (n 3) ,
234-235, The Venice Statement, para. 10.
51
See in particular Helfer & Austin, supra (n 3) , 238; Helfer, supra (n 3), 976; Haugen,
supra (n 25), 66.
52
Cf. Chapman, supra (n 25) , 4.
53
ICESCR, art. 23. The rights referred to include the right to be free from hunger (art.
11(2)), the right to “improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food
by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge” (art. 11(2), and “enjoyment of
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” (art. 12(1)).
54
Chapman, supra (n 25) , 6.
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and evaluated enabling them to become the basis for more new knowledge.”55
This notion is fundamentally noneconomic, as opposed to a technological
understanding of the term, which, as a more recent phenomenon,
conceptualizes science as an enterprise that is profit-oriented. 56 Depending
on the understanding of ‘science’, the benefits to be shared, including
arguably scientific results and other information that can generate further
benefits certainly, must include such scientific findings and other
technological advancements that are produced by academic research, but
should also be understood to include research in specific areas, such as health,
agriculture, and in general areas that pertain to rights foreseen in the ICESCR.
The notion of ‘benefits’, read together with that of scientific
advancements, supports a broad understanding of the term, at least this can
reasonably be argued. Eventually, it is not relevant for the improvement of
living conditions, human health, and the eradication of hunger in the world,
whether discoveries of a scientific or technological nature have been made
by profit-oriented enterprises or publicly funded research institutions. It is
unclear, however, whether the sharing of benefits relates to the concrete
outcomes of scientific progress, or whether it also has a participatory
dimension. 57 The latter option would mean that not only would the fruits of
scientific progress have to be shared among the people of the world, but
science would also have to be a globally cooperative and inclusive process,
including the sharing of scientific resources and information.
The “right to science” 58 also has a participatory dimension, if examined
through a wider human rights lens. Access to science, to research findings
and studies, particularly in digital form, is necessary for participatory
decision-making and for participation in democratic processes in general.
Intellectual property and copyright, by its very nature, constitutes a barrier to
the realization of this facet of the right to access to science. 59 Such a broad
reading is supported by Article 15(2)-(4) ICCPR which require the
contracting parties to take the necessary steps “to achieve the full realization
of this right” including “those necessary for the conservation, the
development and the diffusion of science and culture”; “to respect the
freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity”; and to
“recognize the benefits to be derived from the encouragement and
development of international contacts and co-operation in the scientific and
cultural fields.” 60 To realize and to guarantee these freedoms, it is necessary
55

Chapman, supra (n 25 , 7.
Chapman, supra (n 25) , 8-9.
57
Cf. Chapman, supra (n 25) , 9-10.
58
Cf. Porsdam Mann et al., supra (n 25) .
59
Cf. Porsdam Mann et al., supra (n 25) ., 342-344; Chapman, supra (n 25) , 15-16, see
in general on the conflict between intellectual property and human rights: Laurence R.
Helfer, Mapping the interface between human rights and intellectual property, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6 (Christophe Geiger ed.,
2015).
60
Cf. Chapman, supra (n 25) , 16-17.
56
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to share and communicate information. While the right to share in scientific
advancement and its benefits is not absolute, it is essential for its realization
to enable researchers to inform themselves, to collect and process
information, in other words to research. The Venice Statement is clear in that
intellectual property should neither hinder the advancement of science, nor
the enjoyment of the benefits of science. 61
The author’s right to protection of the moral and material interests resulting
from any scientific, literary or artistic production
One potential limitation to the broad right of Article 15(b) ICESCR is its
neighbor in Article 15(c). The potentially limiting effect of this provision is
better expressed in the Revised Recommendation on Science and Scientific
Researchers. The Recommendation recognizes the “significant value of
science as a common good” and “that open communication of the results,
hypotheses and opinions – as suggested by the phrase “academic freedom” –
lies at the very heart of the scientific process”. It calls on Member States to
“encourage and facilitate access to knowledge, including open access”, while
at the same time demanding that “that the scientific and technological results
of scientific researchers [should] enjoy appropriate legal protection of their
intellectual property, and in particular the protection afforded by patent and
copyright law.” 62
In its 2001 Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, the UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated with concern that
the protection provided for intellectual property at national level is not
necessarily congruent with that required under Article 15(1)(c) ICESCR. 63
The Committee however stressed “that any intellectual property regime that
makes it more difficult for a State party to comply with its core obligations
in relation to health, food, education, especially, or any other right set out in
the Covenant, is inconsistent with the legally binding obligations of the State
party.” According to the Committee, State parties should ensure that their
intellectual property systems do not stand in the way of, but rather facilitate
international cultural and scientific cooperation, 64 and that State parties
should strive to achieve a balance between the “concurrent” requirements of
Article 15(1)(a) and (b) on the one side, and 15(1)(c) on the other. 65 The then
Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, Farida Shaheed, even stated
that “[t]he rights of authors protected by human rights instruments are not to
61

The Venice Statement, para 10.; see Helfer & Austin, supra (n 3) , 136-137, cf. also
Chapman, supra (n 25) , 14.
62
UNESCO, (39th Session) 2017 Revised Recommendation on Science and Scientific
Researchers (ANNEX II).
63
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. (2001) Human Rights and
Intellectual Property, Statement of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
27th Session, UN Doc E/C.12/2001/15, at 6 [hereinafter ‘Human Rights and Intellectual
Property (2001)’], see Chapman, supra (n 25) , 28., Yu, supra (n 47), 90-91.
64
Human Rights and Intellectual Property (2001), at 15.
65
Human Rights and Intellectual Property (2001), at 17.
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be equated with ‘intellectual property rights’”, but that both could be limited
to ensure the protection of other rights. 66 Referring to the Venice Statement,
she highlighted intellectual property’s social function and that monopolies
granted under intellectual property laws should be managed responsibly. 67
In General Comment No. 17, the Committee established five core
obligations that State parties incur “to ensure the satisfaction of minimum
essential [level]” 68 of protection required under Article 15(1)(c) ICESCR.
The relevant core obligations are that State parties are required to “protect the
rights of authors to be recognized as the creators of their scientific, literary
and artistic productions and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, their productions
that would be prejudicial to their honour or reputation”, and to “respect and
protect the basic material interests of authors resulting from their scientific,
literary or artistic productions, which are necessary to enable those authors to
enjoy an adequate standard of living”, and in general to “strike an adequate
balance between the effective protection of the moral and material interests
of authors and States parties’ obligations in relation to the rights to food,
health and education, as well as the rights to take part in cultural life and to
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, or any other right
recognized in the Covenant.”
It is notable in the Comment that the moral rights of authors precede the
guarantee that authors must be able to enjoy an adequate standard of living.
Modern copyright laws, certainly those in developed countries, which
systematic structure and standards of protection have been imported into the
developing world, go beyond these minimum requirements, which casts
doubt on the appropriateness of the balance struck by national legislators. It
has indeed been suggested that modern intellectual property laws provide a
level protection that goes beyond that required by Article 15 ICESCR, but
that this provision could be of assistance in finding a new balance. 69 It
becomes apparent, however, that international human rights instruments do
not support a narrow reading of the right of authors, but make the protection
granted under copyright law if not conditional, then at least complementary

66

On the report, see the contributions of the Special rapporteur Farida Shaheed herself,
as well as those of Lea Shaver and Mylène Bidaut, in Geiger, supra (n 25) respectively at 19,
21 and 30.
67
Paragraph 10 of the Venice Statement states that “the right to enjoy the benefits of
scientific progress and its applications may create tensions with the intellectual property
regime, which is a temporary monopoly with a valuable social function that should be
managed in accordance with a common responsibility to prevent the unacceptable
prioritization of profit for some over benefit for all.”
68
Based on the standard established by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. (1990) General Comment 3. The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, 5th Session
UN Doc E/1991/2, at 10.
69
Amrei Müller, Remarks on the Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of
Scientific Progress and its Applications (Article 15(1)(b) ICESCR), 10 HUM. RTS. L. REV.
765–784, 775 (2010).
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on the enjoyment, and this can only mean access to the expression and
information of works protected by copyright. 70
Enabling citizens to enjoy the benefits of science in the wider sense, or
even to enable citizens to participate actively requires access to relevant
information in the same way that participation in democratic processes
requires access to information in order to form and develop opinions. Access
to science and its products can also have spill-over effects into other areas of
civic engagement and created convective effects. 71 Therefore, access to
science is a precondition not only for scientific production but also for
diffusing scientific production, to create impact and to enable civic
participation in science itself, and in other fields of civic engagement and
decision-making. 72 Ensuring access also requires provision of a proper
infrastructure on a non-discriminatory basis, which in some parts of the world
includes the provision of basic information technology infrastructure. 73
The rights of authors to moral and material benefits must therefore be
interpreted in relation to other fundamental rights alongside which they are
listed as preconditions for their exercise. Their function is to enable cultural
and scientific productions as incentives, on the one side. On the other side, in
order to fulfil their function as rights-in-context, they must be constructed to
“enable rather than constrain cultural participation and access to scientific
progress.” 74 This secondary nature of the right expressed in Article 27 UDHR
and 15 ICESCR is also expressed by the UN Special Rapporteur in the field
of cultural rights, Farida Shaheed, in her 2012 Report when she stated: “The
right to have access to scientific knowledge is pivotal for the realization of
the right to science.” 75
B. The Constitutional Framework for the Right to Research in the EU
For the purpose this contribution, European copyright law is a case study.
The Union’s constitutional microcosm is unique in that it provides a rich
tradition in human rights discourse and practice. More importantly, the
intersection of human, or fundamental rights and ordinary law is more
pronounces in law and in policy than in any other jurisdiction. European
70

Geiger argues that this function of copyright law constitutes an expression of the social
function of the right to property and be reflective of the human rights, historical and
philosophical foundations of intellectual property law, see Christophe Geiger, Taking the
right to culture seriously: time to rethink copyright law, in Geiger (n 25) 84, 86 .
71
Vayena & Tasioulas, supra (n 25), 484.
72
Porsdam Mann et al., supra (n 25) , 343-344, see also Hans Morten Haugen, Human
Rights and Technology—A Conflictual Relationship? Assessing Private Research and the
Right to Adequate Food, 7 JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 224, 232 (2014), stating: “The right
to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress is related to how the direct and indirect results of
science are made available to everyone.”
73
Report on Right to Science, para. 29, 36-37.
74
Paul Torremans, ‘Article 17(2)’, para. 17(2).25 in THE EU CHARTER OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (Peers et al, eds., 2021).
75
Report on Right to Science, para. 27.
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copyright law has been shaped significantly, certainly over the last decade,
by fundamental rights 76 and research plays an important part in the EU’s
policy agenda. 77 The legislator in the EU, where copyright today is to a large
extent within the exclusive competence of the Union, 78 has adopted a ruleexception approach to copyright, which was reflected not only in the systemic
structure of European copyright legislation, but also in the jurisprudence of
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 79 This strict approach
76

The constitutionalization of intellectual property, and copyright and particular, is a
counter movement to the property-paradigm of intellectual property (cf. Christophe Geiger,
„Constitutionalising“ Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of Fundamental Rights on
Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37 IIC 371 (2006)). In the EU, fundamental
rights, as part of the EU’s constitutional normative system, have exercised growing influence
on the harmonization and interpretation of intellectual property, most notable under the
influence of the European judiciary, see Jonathan Griffiths, Constitutionalising or
harmonising? The Court of Justice, the right to property and European copyright law, 31
E.L.REV. 65 (2013), Bernd Justin Jütte, The Beginning of a (Happy?) Relationship:
Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe, 38 E.I.P.R. 11 (2016) and Christophe
Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, The Constitutionalization of Intellectual Property Law in the
EU and the Funke Medien, Pelham and Spiegel Online Decisions of the CJEU: Progress,
but Still Some Way to Go!, 51 IIC 282 (2020). From the interpretation of copyright norms by
the Court of justice in cases such as CJEU, Judgment of 9 February 2012 Luksan, C-277/10,
EU:C:2012:65, CJEU, Judgment of 22 May 2014 Deckmyn, C-201/13, EU:C:2014:2132 and
CJEU, Judgment of 8 September 2016 GS Media, C-160/15, EU:C:2016:644, copyright
norms were recently directly challenged before the highest EU court in CJEU, Judgment of
26 April 2022 Poland v Parliament and Council, C-401/19, EU:C:2022:297; see for a
fundamental rights-based analysis; Christophe Geiger & Bernd Justin Jütte, Towards a
virtuous legal framework for content moderation by digital platforms in the EU? The
Commission’s guidance on article 17 CDSM Directive in the light of the YouTube/Cyando
judgment and the AG’s Opinion in C-401/19, 43 E.I.P.R. 625 (2021); Christophe Geiger &
Bernd Justin Jütte, Platform Liability Under Art. 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single
Market Directive, Automated Filtering and Fundamental Rights: An Impossible Match, 70
GRUR INT. 517 (2021).
77
See below under I. B., see also in Christophe Geiger & Bernd Justin Jütte, The Right
to Research as a Guarantor for Sustainability, Innovation and Justice in EU Copyright Law,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE POST PANDEMIC WORLD: AN INTEGRATED
FRAMEWORK OF SUSTAINABILITY, INNOVATION AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (forthcoming) (Taina
E. Pihlajarinne et al. eds.)
78
See only Ana Ramalho, Conceptualising the European Union’s Competence in
Copyright – What Can the EU Do?, 45 IIC 178 (2014); Ana Ramalho, Copyright law-making
in the EU: what lies under the ‘internal market’ mask, 9 J. INTELLECT. PROP. LAW PRACT.
208 (2014); ANA RAMALHO, THE COMPETENCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN COPYRIGHT
LAWMAKING (2016); Ana Ramalho, The competence and rationale of EU copyright
harmonization, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF EU COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (Eleonora Rosati
ed., 2021), see further BERND JUSTIN JÜTTE, RECONSTRUCTING EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW
FOR THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET: BETWEEN OLD PARADIGMS AND DIGITAL CHALLENGES
535-537 (2017).
79
The CJEU has consistently held that limitations and exceptions to the exclusive rights
of copyright must be interpreted narrowly as they are exceptions to the general rule that
rightholders must enjoy “a high level of protection” in relation to their protected subject
matter, see for example Infopaq I supra (n 7), paras. 40-43 and 56-57; CJEU, Judgment of
16 June 2011 Stichting de Thuiskopie, C-462/09, EU:C:2011:397, paras. 30-32; CJEU,
Judgment of 4 October 2011 FAPL/Murphy, C-429/08, EU:C:2011:631, para. 186, but see
the qualification in paras. 162- 162 whereby copyright exceptions “must be interpreted
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has fortunately evolved in recent years, in particular since the legislator and
the CJEU have framed exceptions and limitations to copyright as user
rights. 80 This makes EU copyright law, viz. the rules that harmonize national
copyright law in the EU Member States, an ideal laboratory to examine the
potential and desirable effects of a right to research on copyright law within
a multinational constitutional system. And this also allows to reflect the
findings and the resulting proposal to the international level and how a right
to research should shape copyright law for a more sustainable future.
1. Fundamental Rights in the EU’s Constitutional Order and their
potential impact to secure a balanced copyright framework
The EU’s constitutional order consist of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU), 81 the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 82 and
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EUCFR). 83 While
the Treaties define the general aims of the EU, determine its competencies,
and set out how these competencies are to be exercised, the Charter represents
the canon of fundamental rights as it applies in the Member States of the EU.
Since the early days of the Union, fundamental rights form an integral part of
the EU’s constitutional order, including international human rights, as the EU
has committed itself to “the strict observance and development of
international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations
Charter”. 84. Before they were formally codified in the EUCFR, the CJEU

strictly, because Article 5(1) of the Copyright Directive is a derogation from the general rule
established by that directive that the copyright holder must authorise any reproduction of his
protected work” but that “[n]one the less, the interpretation of those conditions must enable
the effectiveness of the exception”; see further CJEU, Judgment of 11 December 2011
Painer, C-145/10, EU:C:2011:798, paras. 107-109; Deckmyn supra (n 76), paras. 22-23, here
the CJEU expanded the analysis, leaving room, for the first time in relation to the
interpretation of copyright exceptions for consideration of fundamental rights as part of the
balance within copyright (paras. 26-30); and most recently in CJEU, Judgment of 29 July
2019 Funke Medien NRW, C-469/17, EU:C:2019:623; CJEU, Judgment of 29 July 2019
Pelham and others, C-476/17, EU:C:2019:624; CJEU, Judgment of 29 July 2019 Spiegel
Online, C-516/17, EU:C:2019:625.
80
See Article 17(9) CDSM Directive establishing an enforceable right to benefit from
exceptions in relation to uses of protected works and other subject matter. These rights should
shield such uses from content moderation by way of filtering and blocking performed by
platforms falling within the scope of Article 17 CDSM Directive, see Geiger & Jütte, supra
(n 76), 539-540; the CJEU expressly referred to these mandatory exceptions as part of the
safeguards against a disproportionate limitation on the right to freedom of expression by the
obligations imposed on the relevant online intermediaries as “rights”, Poland v Parliament
and Council supra (n 76), para. 87.
81
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C 326/13 (TEU).
82
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012]
OJ C326/47-390 (TFEU).
83
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/391
(EUCFR).
84
TEU, art. 3(5). This is important as the EU does not have a specific right to science
and culture in its constitutional framework that mirrors the international human right
provisions. See however Peggy Ducolombier, The Perspective of the European Court of
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gradually developed an EU fundamental rights canon as general principles of
EU law which were derived from and formed out of the common
constitutional traditions of the Member States. 85 However, a hierarchy
amongst the fundamental rights of the EU Charter does not exist. 86 The rights
of the Charter are congruent in scope to those of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) in
so far as corresponding rights exist in both documents. 87 This very close
relationship is further illustrated by regular references by the CJEU and its
Advocates General to judgments by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR). 88 While the EU’s commitment to the fundamental rights of the
ECHR is clearly expressed in its self-imposed – yet to be completed –
accession to the Convention, 89 its relation to international human rights is
slightly more complicated. 90 Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the EU is
bound by binding international human rights law, if for no other reason
because of the obligations incurred by its Member States. 91 In so far as
Human Rights on Intellectual Property and Access to Science and Culture, in Geiger supra
(n 25), 79.
85
CJEU, Judgment of 14 May 1974 Nold, 4/73, EU:C:1974:51 1, para. 13; see in relation
to copyright: CJEU, Judgment of 12 September 2006 Laserdisken II, C-479/04,
EU:C:2006:549, para. 61.
86
See however Alexander Peukert, The fundamental right to (intellectual) property and
the discretion of the legislature, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 132, (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015), arguing that certain
fundamental rights, for example the right to freedom of expression under Article 11 EUCFR,
should enjoy priority over other. In particular, the right to property due to its peculiar nature,
should not be positioned at the same level as other fundamental rights due to the “unique
structure” of property rights and because property rights, and intellectual property rights in
particular only exist as “as ‘creatures’ of the legislature”, and it the legislature who defines
their scope.
87
EUCFR, art. 52(3).
88
See for example Pelham and others supra (n 79), para. 34.
89
TEU, art. 6(2), see however the CJEU’s rejection of a first accession agreement,
CJEU, Opinion of 18 December 2014 Adhésion de l’Union à la CEDH, 2/13,
EU:C:2014:2454, underlining the different positions on the EU’s obligations under
international human rights law Tawhida Ahmed & de Jusús Butler, The European Union and
Human Rights: An International Law Perspective, 17 EJIL 771 (2006).
90
Article 3(5) states that the EU “[i]n its relations with the wider world, […] shall uphold
and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall
contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual
respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of
human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the
development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations
Charter.”; Cf. on the nature and evolution of the EU’s international human rights obligations:
Gráinne de Búrca, The Road Not Taken: The European Union as a Global Human Rights
Actor, 105 AM J INT LAW 649 (2011).
91
Ahmed & Butler, supra (n 89) [The European Union and Human Rights: An
International Law Perspective], 61; possibly also by virtue of their jus cogens nature as
suggested by Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EJIL 491–
508, (2008). Although the CJEU has subjected international law rules, such as UC Security
Council resolutions to judicial review under EU law and jus cogens, see CJEU, Judgment of
18 July 2013 Kadi II, Joined Cases C‑584/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, para. 131 where the Court
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international human rights norms have become part of customary
international law, they have become binding on the EU. 92 This makes a
majority of international human rights norms relevant not only to construct
an internationally inspired right to research, but international human rights
norms are also relevant in shaping such at right at European level.
Article 51 EUCFR stipulates that ‘[t]he provisions of [the] Charter are
addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union […]
and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law.’ 93 As
a result, the European legislator is bound by fundamental rights and any
legislation that violates fundamental rights without sufficient justification can
be challenged in the courts of the Member States and eventually before the
CJEU. EU Member States are only bound by the EUCFR whenever they are
implementing EU law, 94 and national courts in the EU Member states must
have regard to fundamental rights when they apply and interpret national
norms that are the result of, or fall within the scope of EU harmonization.95
However, if at national level a situation does not fully fall within the scope
of harmonization under EU law, Member States remain free in their actions
to apply and give effect to national fundamental rights as long as the
application of national fundamental rights does not compromise the primacy,
unity and effectiveness of EU law. 96
This means, however, that as soon as a national law falls within an area
of competence of the European Union, it is subject to EU fundamental rights

stated: “Such a judicial review is indispensable to ensure a fair balance between the
maintenance of international peace and security and the protection of the fundamental rights
and freedoms of the person concerned […] those being shared values of the UN and the
European Union.” See also UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2008),
available
at:
https://europe.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/EU_and_International_Law.pdf, p. 7
[hereinafter ‘OHCHR Report 2008’].
92
CJEU, Judgment of 3 June 2008 Intertanko, EU:C:2008:312, para. 51, see OHCHR
Report 2008, 23.
93
EUCFR, art. 51(1).
94
For example, Member States must transpose directives, which are not directly
applicable in the Member States (TFEU, art. 288, third sentence), into their national law in
full compliance with the fundamental rights of the EU Charter. Therefore, national
legislatures must ensure that their transposition of secondary legislation relies on an
interpretation that ensures that a fair balance is struck between the various fundamental rights
protected under EU law. See e.g. CJEU, Judgment of 29 January 2008 Promusicae, C275/06, EU:C:2008:54, para. 70; CJEU, Judgment of 18 October 2018 Bastei Lübbe, C149/17, EU:C:2018:841, para. 45; see also CJEU, Judgment of 16 July 2015 Coty Germany,
C-580/13, EU:C:2015:485, para. 34. See more generally; PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE
BÚRCA, EU LAW. TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 430-431 (2020),.
95
Specifically in the field of copyright law: CJEU, Judgment of 24 November 2011
Scarlet Extended, C-70/10, EU:C:2011:771); CJEU, Judgment of 16 July 2012 SABAM v
Netlog, C-360/10, EU:C:2012:85, CJEU, Judgement of 15 September 2016 Mc Fadden, C484/14, EU:C:2016:689.
96
Funke Medien NRW supra (n 79), para. 32.
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control and can potentially be challenged if doubts existed as to its
constitutionality. 97 In most cases, the CJEU is simply asked to interpret a
provision of national law and guide its application in the light of EU law. In
these cases, more often than not, the Court provides the referring national
court with more or less precise instructions and then leaves it “for the national
court to ascertain” the correct application of national law in the light of EU
law, including the EU Charter.
Fundamental rights are not absolute, they can be limited to give effect to
other fundamental rights as long as their essence is respected. 98 The concept
of ‘essence’ has been described as “a constant reminder that [the EU’s] core
values are absolute and, as such, are not subject to balancing.” 99 However,
any limitation of a fundamental right must respect the principle of
proportionality, which is an important tool for assessing the constitutionality
of a violation of a fundamental right under the EU Charter. 100 In the EU legal
order, proportionality constitutes an important analytical mechanism to
determine the permissibility of limiting certain rights and interests, including

97

The CJEU has been called upon to examine the constitutionality, in the light of
fundamental rights, of secondary harmonization in the field of copyright law. In this context,
the intensity of the Courts review varies significantly. A good example for a thorough and
structured review is CJEU, Judgment of 22 January 2013 Sky Österreich, C‑283/11,
EU:C:2013:28, paras. 31-68 and slightly less intensive Luksan supra (n 76), paras. 68-72. In
both cases the CJEU was asked to consider in the course of a preliminary reference procedure
under Article 267 TFEU to assess the validity of a provision of national law implemented
pursuant to EU harmonization measures or a provision of EU law directly. A recent important
example is the challenge of the new liability regime for so-called online content sharing
providers brought by the Republic of Poland. This case is special as it constitutes one of the
relatively rare cases in which a Member States requests the annulment of a provision of EU
law, in this case because the Polish government considers the challenged provision to be in
violation of the right to freedom of expression, see for a through discussion of the challenge
Geiger & Jütte, supra (n 76).
98
Article 52(1) EUCFR; see also to that effect Pelham and others supra (n 79); AG
Szpunar, Opinion of 12 December 2018 Pelham and Others, C-476/17, EU:C:2018:1002,
para. 98 and AG Szpunar, Opinion of 6 June 2018 Bastei Lübbe, C-149/17, EU:C:2018:400,
para. 38, and Coty Germany supra (n 97), para. 35. See for example Koen Lenaerts, Limits
on Limitations: The Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU, 20 GER. LAW J. 779 (2019),
and on a discussion of the essence of intellectual property and with further references; Martin
Husovec, The Essence of Intellectual Property Rights Under Article 17(2) of the EU Charter,
20 GER. LAW J. 840–863 (2019).
99
Lenaerts, supra (n 98) [Limits on Limitations: The Essence of Fundamental Rights
in the EU], 793.
100
See further on the influence of this principle on EU copyright law, Orit Fischman
Afori, Proportionality – A New Mega Standard in European Copyright Law, 45 IIC 889,
(2014); Jonas Christofferson, Human Rights and balancing: The principle of proportionality,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 19 (Christophe
Geiger ed., 2015); Peter Teunissen, The balance puzzle: the ECJ’s method of proportionality
review for copyright injunctions, 40 E.I.P.R. 579, (2018); Tuomas Mylly, Regulating with
rights proportionality? Copyright, fundamental rights and internet in the case law of the
Court of Justice of the European Union, in COPYRIGHT AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE
DIGITAL AGE. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN SEARCH OF A COMMON CONSTITUTIONAL
GROUND 54 (Oreste Pollicino, Riccio Giovanni Maria & Bassini Marco eds., 2020).
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fundamental rights. The test often comes to bear when two or more
fundamental rights as they are guaranteed and protected under the ECHR and
the EUCFR come into conflict. 101
In the practice of the European courts, the proportionality test is divided
into three steps. 102 First, a court will determine whether the measure that
potentially infringes a right is appropriate to achieve the aim it is adopted for.
For that purpose, a relevant measure must pursue a legitimate aim and must
be suitable to achieve that aim. 103 Second, the measure in question must be
necessary. A measure is considered necessary if the aim it pursues could not
be achieved by less onerous means. At the third stage a court will conduct a
balancing exercise; this state is also referred to as ‘proportionality strictu
sensu’, and it is the stage where the actual balancing of interest takes place.
In copyright law, proportionality has already become almost synonymous
with the notion of a ‘fair balance’. 104 It has, for example been used to calibrate
the rules for online copyright enforcement by intermediary service
providers. 105 In this context, the CJEU has used proportionality to define the
limits of enforcement obligations by balancing several fundamental rights
with each other. Here, proportionality works as a tool to determine the
interpretation of existing norms in the light of fundamental right. 106
The complex nature of the test 107 has resulted in its creative application

101

As a mechanism that resolves conflicts between fundamental rights, the
proportionality test has, as a result of its function, helped to define the scope of specific
fundamental rights by showing their limits, by defining their inviolable core, see
Christofferson, supra (n 11), 19.
102
For an early application of the proportionality test in EU law see CJEU, Judgment of
13 November 1990 Fedesa, C-331/88, EU:C:1990:391, paras. 12-18.
103
The standard under the first prong of the test if extremely broad. The courts would
only refuse a measure as illegal which is manifestly inappropriate, see DAMIAN CHALMERS,
GARETH DAVIES & GIORGIO MONTI, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 387-388 (2019).
104
See for example Teunissen, supra (n 11), 581, Christofferson, supra (n 11), 35, and
Peter Oliver & Christopher Stothers, Intellectual Property under the Charter: are the Court’s
scales properly calibrated?, 54 C.M.L. REV. 517, 546 (2017), all of which refer to Sky
Österreich supra (n 97), paras. 50-68; see also Caterina Sganga, A decade of fair balance
doctrine, and how to fix it: copyright versus fundamental rights before the CJEU from
Promusicae to Funke Medien, Pelham and Spiegel Online, 41 E.I.P.R. 683 (2019).
105
Christophe Geiger, Giancarlo Frosio and Elena Izyumenko, Intermediary Liability
and Fundamental Rights, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY ONLINE
138 (Giancarlo Frosio, ed., 2020).
106
The role of proportionality can be described as a standard external to copyright law
which enables to strike “a constitutional balance […] within the copyright-private law
sphere.”, and it has also been suggested that proportionality can serve as an internal norm
within copyright’s normative system, Fischman Afori, supra (n 11), 900, see also Christophe
Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Towards a European “Fair Use” Grounded in Freedom of
Expression, 35 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1 (2019). The evolution of the role of the proportionality
principle in EU copyright law is best demonstrated with reference to the CJEU’s case-law,
see for example with a comprehensive summary Teunissen, supra (n 11), critically also
Mylly, supra (n 11).
107
Christofferson, supra (n 11), 19.
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by the CJEU and the ECtHR. However, it is an essential element in the EU’s
constitutional order to resolve conflicts between competing interests,
specifically in multipolar relationships of competing rights. 108 It is not only
applied by the courts, but, as a general principle of EU law, also guides the
legislature as well as the executive branches in the EU, 109 and the Member
States in implementing EU law. Accordingly, acts of the institutions, such as
secondary legislation, and the Member States are subject to judicial review
in the light of the principle of proportionality. 110
Whilst in the practice of the CJEU, proportionality has been used to
interpret existing rules with existing fundamental rights, 111 we will attempt
to explore how a newly shaped right to research can be employed to reinterpret and complement existing copyright law. We argue that the right to
research is a fundamental right that lies hidden in fragments amongst a set of
existing rights and merely requires formal pronunciation. The proportionality
test will assist us in reestablishing the balance between ‘established’
fundamental rights and the right to research as a constitutional imperative.

108

Cf. Christofferson, supra (n 11), 24.
Instructions for the EU institutions on the application of the proportionality principle
are laid down in a special protocol to the TFEU: Consolidated version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union - PROTOCOLS - Protocol (No 2) on the application of
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality [2008] OJ C 115/206. The CJEU itself, it
is interesting to note applies the test more liberally, not always distinguishing clearly between
the three separate steps, but often folds the third stage of the test into stage one or two, or
often simple omits the third stage completely in cases in which the test has already failed at
an earlier stage, see CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra (n 97), 583.
110
Cf. Takis Tridimas, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 655 (2007).
Proportionality as a ground for judicial review was introduced in CJEU, Judgment of 17
December 1970 Internationale Handelgesellschaft, C-11/70, EU:C:1970:114 and has since
been a general principle of EU law. In 2009, it was expressly recognized in Article 5(4)
TFEU and the EUCFR refers to proportionality as a tool to justify prima facie violations of
the Charter rights (Article 52(1) EUCFR). Article 5 of the Protocol (No 2) on the Application
of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality requires the EU legislature to subject
legislation to a subsidiarity and proportionality test.
111
Christophe Geiger, The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union:
Harmonizing, Creating and sometimes Disrupting Copyright Law in the European Union, in
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN EU AND INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW 435 (Irini Stamatoudi
ed., 2016). The ECtHR also refers regularly to proportionality in cases concerning
intellectual property, for example is assessing whether criminal sanction for large-scale
copyright infringements online are appropriate (ECtHR (5th section) Fredrik Neij and Peter
Sunde Kolmisoppi (The Pirate Bay) v Sweden App no 40397/12 (ECtHR, 19 February 2013)
under D.); see for comments: Jütte, supra (n 76), 15. More generally on the use of the
proportionality principle by the ECtHR in copyright cases, see Christophe Geiger & Elena
Izyumenko, Shaping Intellectual Property Rights through Human Rights Adjudication: The
Example of the European Court of Human Rights, 46 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW 527
(2020); Oleg Soldatov, Copyright and fundamental rights in European Court of Human
Rights case law, in COPYRIGHT AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE. A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN SEARCH OF A COMMON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 99 (Oreste
Pollicino, Giovanni Maria Riccio & Marco Bassini eds., 2020).
109
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2. European Values and the Objectives of the Union: the right to
research as a crucial step towards a sustainable copyright system
Article 2 of the TEU lists the values of the EU, which itself is established
by Article 1 of the Treaty. The values include the respect for human dignity,
respect for human rights, non-discrimination and solidarity. 112 These values
are programmatic, 113 they inspire and guide the action of the Union and its
Member States, which share these values with the EU as a supranational
institution.114 The “ever closer Union” 115 established by the Treaties links the
EU with its Member States on a foundation of norms and values, at the heart
of which are the fundamental rights set out in the EUCFR. 116 These values
common to all Member States constitute an untouchable core of the legal
order that is the EU. 117
The aims and goals of the Union have grown in number over time and
their nature has changed with the maturing of the Union into a constitutional
legal order. 118 Article 3 TEU defines the aims of the Union. It shall promote
peace, its values and the well-being of its people. 119 One of the most
prominent, and more concrete aims is the establishment of an internal market.
This internal market is not an end in itself but should “work for sustainable
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price
stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full
employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and
improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and
technological advance.” 120 Sustainability had found its place in the TEU in
already in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which established the European
Union. 121 Article B of the Treaty of Maastricht stated that that Union sets
itself the objective “to promote economic and social progress, which is
balanced and sustainable, in particular through the creation of an area without

112

TEU, art. 2 reads: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity,
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in
a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality
between women and men prevail.”
113
Marcus Klamer and Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Article 2’, para. 6 in THE EU TREATIES AND
THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. A COMMENTARY (Manuel Kellerbauer, Marcus
Klamert & Jonathan Tomkin eds., 2019).
114
TEU, art. 2, second sentence.
115
TEU, art. 1 states that the “Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. Reference to this political mantra can also
be found on the respective preambulatory parts of the TEU and the TFEU.
116
Adhésion de l’Union à la CEDH supra (n 89), paras. 167-169.
117
See on the origins of the values and its initially implied nature: Marcus Klamer and
Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Article 2’, paras. 1-5 in Kellerbauer et al., supra (n 113).
118
Joris Larik, From Speciality to a Constitutional Sense of Purpose: on the Changing
Role of the Objectives of the European Union, 63 INT COMP LAW Q 935, 936 (2014)).
119
TEU, art. 3(1).
120
Emphasis added.
121
Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C 191/1.
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internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and social
cohesion”. Environmental protection was merely included as an aspiration to
which the EU claimed to be determined to. The EU Charter, proclaimed in
2000, and which entered into force in 2009, includes an obligation to include
“high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality
of the environment […] ensured in accordance with the principle of
sustainable development” into the objectives of the EU. 122 Accordingly, the
TEU was changed into its current wording. These very abstract aims find
concrete expression is special provisions contained in the TEU as well as the
TFEU and the policies of the EU. 123
The aims of the Union are binding on its institutions, but they neither
create direct obligations for the Union to act, nor do they create competences
for Union action. 124 The aims set out in Article 3 TEU “merely lay down a
programme” which the EU institutions and the Member States must
implement. 125 The aims of the Union therefore have a guiding rather than an
instructive function for the actions of the EU’s institutions, which also
includes the passing of legislation. This does not mean that these objectives
are merely inspirational, they are part of the EU’s constitutional order, and
they must inform policies and legislation. 126
The aims of the Union are abstract notions and are difficult to define. The
CJEU itself has failed to provide assistance in shaping the substance of these
programmatic aims. To define these broad notions, which are, of course, also
relevant in defining the concrete normative substance of intellectual property
rights harmonized under EU law, it is instrumental to look for help outside
the domain of EU law. A beneficial side-effect of a more global approach to
defining the aims of the Union, for the purposes of our argument, is that aims
of the Union can be defined and located at a more general and international
level. As a result, our findings can also be translated into an international
discourse on a right to research.
Amongst the aims of the EU are sustainability and technological
advancement, two aims that also feature prominently in the international
development agenda. 127 These two aims are closely interlinked in the sense
that sustainable development inevitably requires technological advancement,

122
123

EUCFR, art. 37.
Rudolf Streinz, ‘Artikel 3 EUV‘, para. 1 in EUV⁄AEUV (Rudof Streinz ed., 3rd edn,

2018).
124

Cf. AG Sharpston, Opinion of 21 December 2016 Accord de libre-échange avec
Singapour, 2/15, EU:C:2016:992, para. 495.
125
CJEU, Judgement of 2 November 1999 Portugal v Council, C-149/96,
EU:C:1999:574, para. 86.
126
See Nicolas de Sadeleer, Sustainable development in EU law: still a long way to go,
6 JINDAL GLOBAL LAW REVIEW 39, 58 (2015), who refers to sustainability as a “binding
constitutional objective.“
127
General Assembly (2015) Resolution 70. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development, 70th Session, A/Res/70/1.
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which in itself should be sustainable.
A definition for ‘sustainability’ can be found at international level where
the homonymous 1987 UN Commission introduced the so-called Bundtlanddefinition. According to this definition, sustainability means “meeting the
needs of the present whilst ensuring future generations can meet their own
needs.” 128 Sustainability, under this definition, has a clear welfare dimension
with an intergenerational aspect. The European Commission has developed
aspects of the notion of ‘sustainability’ in many of its policy programs,
especially over the last decade. For example, in its “Europe 2020” strategy,
the Commission defined “sustainable growth”, as one of its three priorities as
the need to “[promote] a more resource efficient, greener and more
competitive economy”. 129 Further, in the 2016 Communication “Next steps
for a sustainable future”, adopting and further refining the Bundtlanddefinition, the Commission underlined that sustainability requires a
commitment “to development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. A
life of dignity for all within the planet's limits that reconciles economic
prosperity and efficiency, peaceful societies, social inclusion and
environmental responsibility is at the essence of sustainable development”. 130
This definition broadens the notion of sustainability, which is an objective or
aim that permeates a multitude of policy areas, first and foremost within the
European internal market. These areas range from “youth unemployment to
ageing populations, climate change, pollution, sustainable energy and
migration.” But the Commission’s approach also clearly highlights a global
responsibility that reaches beyond the borders of the internal market, and the
EU for that purpose. What is more important however, certainly for the
purposes of our argument, is creating a link to technological development.
The Commission states rather firmly that “[for] these challenges to become
opportunities for new businesses and new jobs, a strong engagement in
128

World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common
Future, 1987, Chapter 2, para. 1. See for a critical discussion and arguing for a wider, more
detailed notion of sustainability, Sander R.W. van Hees, Sustainable Development in the EU:
Redefining and Operationalizing the Concept, 10 UTRECHT LAW REVIEW 60, 75(2014). The
author defines sustainable development as follows: “Sustainable development means
stimulating and encouraging economic development (e.g. more jobs, creativity,
entrepreneurship and revenue), whilst protecting and improving important aspects (at the
global and European level) of nature and society (inter alia natural assets, public health and
fundamental rights) for the benefit of present and future generations.”
129
Commission, Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth,
Brussels 3.3.2020, COM(2010) 2020 final, p. 5, in another Communication the Commission
highlights that a post-pandemic recovery “must guide and build a more sustainable, resilient
and fairer Europe for the next generation” and underlines a “crucial role of research and
innovation in driving the shift towards a clean, circular, competitive and climate neutral
economy” by dedicating “25% of the EU budget […] on climate investments and additional
funding for Horizon Europe.” (Commission, Europe's moment: Repair and Prepare for the
Next Generation, Brussels, 27.5.2020, COM(2020) 456 final, p. 1 and 6).
130
Commission, Next steps for a sustainable European future. European action for
sustainability, Brussels, 22.11.2016, COM(2016) 739 final, p. 1.
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research and innovation is needed.” 131 This essential connection is also
apparent in other policy documents, in which the Commission interconnects
sustainability, innovation, research and other, broader goals of the Union. 132
Because of its overarching nature as one of the major policy goals, the
EU relies on sustainability throughout its policy areas, including its external
trade policy. 133 These ambitions must necessarily also spill over into
intellectual property policy, but there is still room for development. In its
2020 Communication on an intellectual property action plan, the Commission
stresses the importance of intellectual property to “boost recovery and
resilience” in order to “offer valuable and sustainable jobs to society”.134
However, sustainability does not appear as a general theme throughout the
policy document, but only appears occasionally in very specific contexts. 135
The relevant policy documents frequently refer to research as a necessary
driver for innovation and sustainability. 136 Intellectual property, in these
contexts, is presented as an enabler. For example, the “Intellectual Property
Action Plan” focusses on pooling of resources and easier licensing solutions
131

Ibid (emphasis added).
See
for
example
Commission,
Energy
2020
A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy, Brussels, 10.11.2010, COM(2010)
639 final, p. 15: “EU researchers and companies need to increase their efforts to remain at
the forefront of the booming international market for energy technology and, where it is
mutually beneficial, they should step up cooperation with third countries in specific
technologies.”, and Commission, State of the Energy Union 2015, Brussels, 18.11.2015
COM(2015) 572 final, p. 13: “Research, innovation (R&I) and competitiveness are
paramount to accelerate the EU energy transition and to reap its benefits in terms of jobs and
growth that the Energy union can bring.”
133
European Commission, Trade Policy Review. An Open, Sustainable and Assertive
Trade
Policy,
(Luxembourg
2021),
available
at:
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2021/april/tradoc_159541.0270_EN_05.pdf.
The
document highlights the EU’s commitment to tackle new internal and external challenges,
for example those created by the COVID-19 pandemic and the necessary economic recovery,
including “green and digital transformations” for “building a more resilient Europe in the
world” (p.5). The document also highlights the importance of intellectual property in this
context (p. 6). See also Samatha Velluti, The Promotion and Integration of Human Rights in
EU External Trade Relations, 32 UTRECHT J. INT. EUR. LAW 41, 57-61 ((2016).
134
Commission, Making the most of the EU’s innovative potential. An intellectual
property action plan to support the EU’s recovery and resilience Communication, Brussels,
25.11.2020, COM(2020) 760 final, p. 1 (emphasis omitted).
135
For example, in relation to geographical indications “part of Europe's cultural
heritage and contribute to the social, environmental and economic sustainability of the rural
economy” and with reference to the EUs “Farm to Fork” strategy (Commission. A Farm to
Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system, Brussels,
20.5.2020, COM(2020) 381 final; or in relation to Community Plant variety rights and the
need to develop new plant varieties in line with the objectives of the European Green Deal
(Commission, The European Green Deal, Brussels, 11.12.2019, COM(2019) 640 final). The
European Green Deal also reminds of the horizontal nature of sustainability in its
introduction when it states: “The EU has the collective ability to transform its economy and
society to put it on a more sustainable path. It can build on its strengths as a global leader on
climate and environmental measures, consumer protection, and workers’ rights.” (p.2)
136
See only COM(2019) 640 final, p. 9 and COM(2020) 381 final, pp. 15-18.
132
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to “facilitate access to critical IP in the times of crisis” and the facilitation of
compulsory licensing at national level. 137 Specifically in relation to
copyright, the Commission suggests more transparency in relation to
ownership and management and the use of high quality metadata, supported
by new technologies such as blockchain to ensure information
transparency. 138 These actions relate largely to an intellectual property
infrastructure as opposed to substantive changes to an inherently restrictive
intellectual property system. Albeit the relatively weak link between
intellectual property and sustainability, which is much more pronounced in
the literature at international level, 139 regular references to research,
intellectual property and sustainability as drivers of an innovative and
sustainable European economy and society must be understood as a
responsibility and mission to also examine current intellectual property
legislation in the light of these aims. 140
Sustainability in only one of the aims of the Union, but certainly one that
can help to re-evaluate and rethink the way copyright currently supports the
attainment of these aims. And, of course, it has to be considered together with
the other aims included in Article 5 TEU. Taking sustainability as a starting
point with its fairly slim definition as “meeting the needs of the present whilst
ensuring future generations can meet their own needs”, it is possible to
formulate as a mission of the EU to develop a sustainable EU copyright
system: Copyright should foster innovation and technological advance (as
another, interrelated aim of the Union), provide appropriate remuneration to
137

COM(2020) 760 final, p. 11.
COM(2020) 760 final, p. 12.
139
Most of these contributions build on the United Nation’s Sustainability Goals, see for
example Margaret Chon, Recasting Intellectual Property in Light of the U.N. Sustainable
Development Goals: Towards Knowledge Governance, 34 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 763 (2019);
Ahmed Abdel-Latif & Pedro Roffe, The Interface Between Intellectual Property and
Sustainable Development, in HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESEARCH (Irene
Calboli & Maria Lillà Montagnani eds., 2021), the latter argue that despite extensive
multilateral discussions in various fora on a range of issues, which, some of which the authors
address in exemplary way in their chapter, “ they have not, in general, resulted in changes to
existing international IP rules on the creation of new ones to accommodate some of these
concerns (with the notable exception of public health and access to medicines which is of
significant importance in the context of the response to the COVID-19 crisis):” See further
Freedom-Kai Phillips, Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional Knowledge: Enabler of
Sustainable Dveelopment, 32 UTRECHT J. INT. EUR. LAW 1 (2016); Ioannis E. Nikolaou &
Konstantinos I. Evangelinos & Walter Leal Filho, Intellectual property and environmental
innovation: an explanation using the institutional and resource-based theories, 6 INT. J.
FORESIGHT AND INNOVATION POLICY 268 (2010); Elisabeth Eppinger et al., Sustainability
transitions in manufacturing: the role of intellectual property, 49 CURRENT OPINION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 118 (2021) .
140
See more detailed Christophe Geiger and Bernd Justin Jütte, The Right to Research
as Guarantor for Sustainability, Innovation and Justice in EU Copyright Law, in Rethinking
the Role of Intellectual Property Rights in the Post Pandemic World: An Integrated
Framework of Sustainability, Innovation and Global Justice (Taina Pihlajarinne, Jukka.
Mähönen and Pratyush Upreti, eds., forthcoming 2023), available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4140627.
138
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creators (needs of the present) while at the same time ensuring that
downstream creativity and innovation is not unnecessarily hindered (needs of
the future generations). A balanced copyright system geared toward
sustainability that allows for flexibility and ease of access 141 to necessary
information and research resources, the Union could ensure that the canon of
values its sets out as guidelines for its constitutional order can be
progressively realized.
While this is a first attempt to develop the idea of a ‘sustainable
copyright’, the direction of a development towards a reshaping of copyright
norms must be one towards an enabling framework. We posit here that a right
to research, anchored in the constitutional framework of the EU, could serve
to reflect and represent the aims of the Union.
C. A European Right to Research as a combined reading of existing
fundamental rights
The fundamental rights of the ECHR and the EUCFR are more defined
compared to their international counterparts. They benefit from a rich and
extensive body of case law in which the CJEU and the ECtHR 142 have
developed the substance of the rights contained in both documents, and in
which the Courts have also partially clarified the relations between the
various fundamental rights. Based on this rich jurisprudence, we will examine
some of the fundamental rights that contain elements out of which we will
then undertake to construct a right to research à l’européenne.
1. Freedom of Expression and the right to receive and impart
information
The right to freedom of expression is protected under Article 10 of the
ECHR and Article 11 of the EUCFR. The broad guarantee of the right of
freedom of expression includes the right to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority” 143 and extends to natural
141

Sheridan, supra (n 4), the author frames her critique of modern copyright around an
“access rights model” that defines access in “quality and quantity of access” (53). Her
‘knowledge principle is based on the idea that “access to the intellectual commons allows for
the freedom of movement of knowledge resources, and in turn, positively stimulates the
processes of knowledge production, participation, and transmission that leads to more
production of knowledge resources.” (104); see Geiger, (n 4).
142
See specifically on the gradual development of the interrelation between intellectual
property and other fundamental rights ECtHR Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation
Frontier Revisited: Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human Rights, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2020),
and Geiger & Izyumenko, supra (n 111).
143
ECHR, art. 10(1). The ECtHR has interpreted Article 10 also to apply in situations
in which the right guaranteed under the provision are effectively interfered with by private
parties in the course of employment relationships (EctHR, Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, Appl. no.
39293/98, 29 February 2000, para. 38.) stemming from a positive obligation of the state
(ECtHR, Young, James and Webster v. The United Kingdom, Appl. nos. 7601/76; 7806/77,
13 August 1981, para. 55).
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and legal persons. 144 It obliges Member States not only to refrain from
restricting the right to freedom of expression, but also to provide for a
framework that protects the exercise of this right in certain circumstances.
The Court acknowledged that Article 10 of the Convention had to be
interpreted as imposing on States a positive obligation to create an
appropriate regulatory framework to ensure effective protection of
journalists’ freedom of expression on the Internet. 145 The right is subject to
limitation set out in Article 10(2). It can be limited or restricted to the extent
necessary in a democratic society and for a variety of reasons including “the
interests of others”. In the jurisprudence of the ECtHR these interests of
others have been interpreted to include the right of rightholders. 146
The EUCFR guarantees the same right under Article 11. 147 The provision
itself does not contain a limitation that corresponds to Article 10(2) ECHR.
However, Article 52 EUCFR provides that limitations to the exercise of rights
granted under the Charter must be “provided for by law and respect the
essence of those rights and freedoms.”
The ECtHR has conceived copyright as an exception to the right to
freedom of expression. In two decisions handed own in 2013, the Court
argued that the use of works protected by copyright constitute exercised of
144

ECtHR, Çetin and Others v. Turkey, Appl. nos. 40153/98 and 40160/98, 13 February
2003, para. 57.
145
ECtHR, Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine, Appl. no. 33014/05,
5 May 2011, para. 64.
146
ECtHR, Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi (The Pirate Bay) v. Sweden, Appl.
no. 40397/12, 19 February 2013, under D: “The Court reiterates that the test of “necessity in
a democratic society” requires it to determine whether the interference complained of
corresponded to a “pressing social need” […]. The test of whether an interference was
necessary in a democratic society cannot be applied in absolute terms. On the contrary, the
Court must take into account various factors, such as the nature of the competing interests
involved and the degree to which those interests require protection in the circumstances of
the case. In the present case, the Court is called upon to weigh, on the one hand, the interest
of the applicants to facilitate the sharing of the information in question and, on the other, the
interest in protecting the rights of the copyright-holders. As to the weight afforded to the
interest of protecting the copyright-holders, the Court would stress that intellectual property
benefits from the protection afforded by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention […]
Moreover, it reiterates the principle that genuine, effective exercise of the rights protected
by that provision does not depend merely on the State’s duty not to interfere, but may require
positive measures of protection […] Thus, the respondent State had to balance two
competing interests which were both protected by the Convention. In such a case, the State
benefits from a wide margin of appreciation […].”
147
See the explanatory note to Article 11 EUCFR which states: “Article 11 corresponds
to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights” (Explanations relating to the
Charter of Fundamental Rights, [2007] OJ C 303/17).
Article 52(3) further provides that “[in] so far as this Charter contains rights which
correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid
down by the said Convention.” Accordingly, the scope of protection under the Charter is the
same as under the Convention. However, in principle, the EU can foresee a higher level of
protection for corresponding rights in the Charter (EUCFR, art. 52(3), second sentence)
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the right of freedom of expression and the exclusive rights of rightholders are
restrictions to this right. In Ashby Donald 148 and The Pirate Bay 149 cases, the
Court concluded that the interferences with the right granted by the
Convention were justified, but also suggested that in other cases, the
balancing of interests between freedom of expression and the right to
property could permit uses that constitute prima facie infringements of
copyright. 150
The CJEU is not so clear on the relation between copyright and freedom
of expression. What is clear is that conflicts between the two rights are
internalized in copyright law. 151 In the 2019 landmark ruling in Pelham v
Hütter and Schneider-Esleben 152, the CJEU ruled that the owner of a right in
a sound recording cannot prevent the use of sample of that recording if the
user integrates the sample in a new work “in a modified form unrecognisable
to the ear”. 153 According to the Court, such a use does not amount to a
reproduction within the meaning of Article 2(c) InfoSoc Directive. Moreover,
in Funke Medien v Bundesrepublik Deutschland 154 and Spiegel Online v
Volker Beck, 155 the Court ruled that in certain cases full reproductions of
protected works do not require authorization if such uses fall within one of
the exceptions included in Article 5(1)-(3) InfoSoc Directive. These
exceptions, as implemented into national law and interpreted and applied by
national courts, must be interpreted in the light of fundamental rights, having
regard to the “nature of the ‘speech’ or information at issue” 156 and the extent
of the reproduction must be proportionate, i.e. it “must not be extended
beyond the confines of what it necessary to achieve the informatory
purpose” 157 of the reproduction.

148

ECtHR, Ashby Donald and other v France, Appl. no. 36769/08, 10 January 2013.
ECtHR, Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi (The Pirate Bay) v. Sweden, Appl.
no. 40397/12, 19 February 2013.
150
See for example with comments on both cases: Geiger, supra (n 4), 85-86; Christophe
Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Copyright on the Human Rights’ Trial: Redefining the
Boundaries of Exclusivity Through Freedom of Expression, 42 IIC 316 (2014); Dirk
Voorhoof, Freedom of expression and the right to information: Implications for copyright,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 331
(Christophe Geiger ed., 2015); Jütte, supra (n 76).
151
Bernd Justin Jütte & Joao Pedro Quintais, The Pelham Chronicles: sampling,
copyright and fundamental rights, 16 J. INTELLECT. PROP. L. PRACT. 213–225, 222 (2021);
Geiger & Izyumenko, supra (n 76), 285.
152
Pelham and others supra (n 79), see for comments Jütte & Quintais, supra (n 151);
Martin Senftleben, Flexibility Grave – Partial Reproduction Focus and Closed System
Fetishism in CJEU, Pelham, 51 IIC 751 (2020).
153
See on the judgment Bernd Justin Jütte & João Pedro Quintais, Advocate General
turns down the music - sampling is not a fundamental right under EU copyright law: Pelham
v Hutter, 41 E.I.P.R 654 (2019); Jütte & Quintais, supra (n 151); Senftleben, supra (n 152).
154
Funke Medien NRW supra (n 79).
155
Spiegel Online supra (n 79).
156
Funke Medien NRW supra (n 79), para. 74.
157
Spiegel Online supra (n 79), para. 83.
149
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In all three cases, the CJEU balanced the proprietary interest of
rightholders against the right to freedom of expression in its different
facets. 158 While in Pelham, the freedom of the arts, as an emanation of the
right to freedom of expression, was most relevant, in Spiegel Online and
Funke Medien the right to information in its two dimensions was closely
examined. The Court here recognized the importance of a free press, arguing
that “the purpose of the press, in a democratic society governed by the rule
of law, justifies it in informing the public, without restrictions other than
those that are strictly necessary”. 159 It is this informatory purpose that enables
us to create a connection to a right to research.
It is interesting to note that the Advocate General in Funke Medien took
a completely different approach. Instead of arguing on the permissibility of
using works protected by copyright, in this case periodic briefing reports
which were classified as confidential and only provided to select members of
the German Parliament, AG Szpunar suggested that such document,
potentially failing the required standard of originality, should not attract
copyright protection. 160 He further argued that the suppression, or control of
information is not the purpose of copyright law and that other mechanisms
serve the purpose of keeping information secret or exclusive. 161
The informatory function of the right to freedom of expression as an
active and passive right to transmit information, opinions and, in essence,
forms of expression is highlighted particularly well in the jurisprudence of
the ECtHR. 162 Privilege is given to expression, unless the expression of an
opinion undermines the foundations of a democratic society. 163 Parallels can

158

See on all three decisions Geiger & Izyumenko, supra (n 76), Bernd Justin Jütte,
Copyright and Fundamental Rights in the Digital Single Market, in EU INTERNET LAW IN
THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET 3, (Tatiana-Eleni Synodinou et al. eds., 2021); Bernd Justin
Jütte, Finding the Balance in Copyright Law: Internal and External Control Through
Fundamental Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 461, (Paul
Torremans ed., 2020); Teunissen, supra (n 11); Thom Snijders & Stijn van Deursen, The
Road Not Taken – the CJEU Sheds Light on the Role of Fundamental Rights in the European
Copyright Framework – a Case Note on the Pelham, Spiegel Online and Funke Medien
Decisions, 50 IIC 176 (2019) ; Caterina Sganga, A decade of fair balance doctrine, and how
to fix it: copyright versus fundamental rights before the CJEU from Promusicae to Funke
Medien, Pelham and Spiegel Online, 41 E.I.P.R 683 (2019); specifically on Funke Medien
see Bernd Justin Jütte & Giulia Priora, Leaking of secret military reports qualifies as
reporting of current events, 15 J. INTELLECT. PROP. LAW PRACT. 681 (2020), on Spiegel
Online see Giulia Priora & Bernd Justin Jütte &, No copyright infringement for publication
by the press of politician’s controversial essay, 15 J. INTELLECT. PROP. LAW PRACT. 583
(2020).
159
Spiegel Online supra (n 79), para. 72.
160
Cf. AG Szpunar, Opinion of 25 October 2018 Funke Medien NRW, C-469/17,
EU:C:2018:870, para. 62
161
Funke Medien NRW supra (n 160), para. 64.
162
See only ECtHR, Handyside v. the United Kingdom, Appl. no. 5493/72, 7 December
1976, para. 49 and Axel Springer AG v. Germany, Appl. no. 39954/08, § 90, ECHR, paras.
78 and 90.
163
This is implicit in the permitted limitation to the right to freedom of expression under
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be drawn to the development of the substantive scope of academic freedom
at international level, 164 which is also a broad right accommodating a wide
array of expression and opinions, including pseudo-science. 165
The Strasbourg Court determined that access to information or its
collection is a privileged act, for example for journalists 166 and researchers
more generally in relation to activities in the public interest, noting in
Gillberg v. Sweden that a negative right to access also exists. 167 Academic
research is also privileged, but the justifications for an elevated right to access
to information are different. 168 It is also instrumental to look at the rich
jurisprudence of both European courts on intermediary liability for online
copyright infringement 169, but also website blocking and blocking and
filtering of information in general. This case law demonstrates the importance
of the right to freedom of expression and the right to receive and impart
information in Europe’s constitutional tradition 170.
The CJEU underlined repeatedly that copyright enforcement by means of
blocking and filtering cannot lead to the suppression of information
unprotected by copyright, or the use of works protected by copyright falling
under exceptions or limitations to copyright. Already in its earlier case law,

the ECHR: “The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of
the judiciary.” (emphasis added).
164
See infra under I. C. 2.
165
General Assembly (2020) Report on academic freedom and the freedom of opinion
and expression,75th Session, A/75/261, para. 29, the regulation of “pseudoscientific,
polemical, advocacy-driven or antisemitic or racist” academic work should not be limited by
fundamental rights, but left to the self-regulatory governance structures of academic
institutions.
166
ECtHR, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland, Appl.
no. 931/13, 27 June 2017, para. 128; Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, Appl.
no. 18030/11, 8 November 2016, para. 130; Guseva v. Bulgaria, Appl. no. 6987/07, 17
February 2015, para. 37; Shapovalov v. Ukraine, Appl. no. 45835/05, 31 July 2012, para.
68. See for a systematic comparison between the right to access to information and data
protection and its parallel to copyright law Annelies Vandendriessche & Bernd Justin Jütte,
Responsible Information Sharing Converging boundaries between private and public in
privacy and copyright law, 10 JIPITEC 310 (2019).
167
ECtHR, Kenedi v. Hungary, Appl. no. 31475/05, 26 May 2009, Gillberg v. Sweden,
Appl no. 41723/06, 03 April 2012, Roşiianu v. Romania, Appl. no. 27329/06, 24 June
2014, Shapovalov v. Ukraine, Appl. no. 45835/05, 31 July 2012.
168
ECtRH, Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v. Turkey, Appl. nos. 23536/94 and 24408/94, 8 July
1999, paras. 61-67; Kenedi v. Hungary, Appl. no. 31475/05, 26 May 2009, para. 42; Gillberg
v. Sweden, Appl. No. 41723/06, 3 April 2012, para. 93.
169
See Geiger and Jütte, supra (n 76).
170
See on this topic Christophe Geiger and Elena Izyumenko, The Role of Human Rights
in Copyright Enforcement Online: Elaborating a Legal Framework for Website Blocking, 32
Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 43 (2016).
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the Court has limited the obligations that can be imposed on online
intermediaries with reference to competing fundamental rights. 171 These
limitations extend to the provision of personal data of internet users to
identify infringers in Promusicae v Teléfonica, 172 to the scope of blocking
and filtering injunctions in SABAM v Netlog173 and Scarlet Extended v
SABAM, 174 and to the obligation of operators of open wireless networks in
Mc Fadden v Sony Music. 175 Common to all these cases is that the Court
refused to grant unconditional protection to copyright if this would mean that
other rights, for example the right to freedom of expression, would be
disproportionally infringed. The Court particularly highlighted that the right
to receive information of internet users in general would be critical in
assessing the scope of injunctions. 176
On website blocking in general the ECtHR ruled that restricting access to
websites constitutes an infringement of the right to receive an impart
information, even if the blocking of a particular website is only an incidental.
The mere fact that a website is, even temporarily unavailable, restricts the
owner of that website in their right to impart information, and the general
public of the right to receive information. 177
The expression of this balance is not only reflected, as interpreted by the
Court in the cases described above, in Article 15 E-Commerce Directive, 178
it has also been carried over into the sector specific CDSM Directive, 179
which prohibits imposing obligation on specific platforms to install general
monitoring or filtering mechanisms to enforce copyright on their services. It
was the adoption of the CDSM Directive that gave the CJEU the opportunity

171

See Jütte, supra (n 158), 17-19; CHRISTINA ANGELOPOULOS, EUROPEAN
INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY IN COPYRIGHT. A TORT-BASED ANALYSIS 108-143 (2016),.
172
Promusicae supra (n 97).
173
SABAM v Netlog supra (n 95).
174
Scarlet Extended supra (n 95).
175
Mc Fadden supra (n 95).
176
SABAM v Netlog supra (n 95), para. 48; Scarlet Extended supra (n 95), para. 50;
CJEU, Judgment of 27 March 2014 UPC Telekabel Wien, C-314/12, EU:C:2014:192, para.
62, Mc Fadden supra (n 95), para. 93, In his Opinion in Mc Fadden, AG Szpunar took an
even more restrictive position and argued who argued: “More generally, I would observe that
any general obligation to make access to a Wi-Fi network secure, as a means of protecting
copyright on the Internet, could be a disadvantage for society as a whole and one that could
outweigh the potential benefits for rightholders.“ (AG Szpunar, Opinion of 16 June 2016
Mc Fadden, C‑484/14, EU:C:2016:170, para. 148.)
177
ECtHR, Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, Appl. no. 13585/88, 26
November 1991, para. 59(b), with further references summarizing its prior case law; Series
A no. 216, and Guerra and Others v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89, 19 February 1998, para. 53.
See also further on this topic Christophe Geiger and Elena Izyumenko, Blocking Orders:
Assessing Tensions with Human Rights, in Frosio (n 105) 566.
178
Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in
particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce'),
[200] OJ L 178/1.
179
Directive (EU) 2019/790 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market,
[2019] OJ L 130/125 (CDSM Directive).
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to reiterate its position on the importance of the right to freedom of
expression. In shaping the enforcement rules for so-called-online contentsharing service provides (OCSSPs), the Court restated that the ex-ante
blocking of potentially infringing uploads must be reduced to a necessary
minimum. This position was, slightly nuanced but in principle equivalent,
shared by the European Commission and most national legislators. 180
Similarly, the Court has also ruled that the employment of technological
protection measures, which enjoy protection under Article 6 InfoSoc
Directive and Article 7 Software Directive, must not prevent uses that are
lawful. To respect the principle of proportionality, ‘digital locks’ cannot be
used to prevent uses that do not have as their primary aim the infringement
of copyright. 181
The jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR illustrates that the right to
freedom of expression can only be limited under strict conditions. The
purpose of this fundamental right, it becomes clear, is to enable
communication and access to information. In relation to copyright, the courts
have repeatedly stressed that copyright cannot stand in the way of a relatively
unimpeded access to information. More importantly, the CJEU has also
stressed that the purpose of copyright is not to protect information or ideas.
The fundamental principle of copyright law that copyright protects
expressions and not ideas is reflected in the balance struck by the Court of
Justice, albeit implicitly, in Pelham, but also more expressly in Funke
Medien.
2. Academic Freedom and scientific research
A right to academic freedom as such does not exist in the ECHR but is
implicitly subsumed under the right to freedom of expression. 182 The EUCFR
gives concrete expression to freedom of the arts and sciences and academic
freedom as express rights in Article 13. The pooling of these separate rights
180

The Advocate General highlighted that “[the] preventive ‘over-blocking’ of all of
those legitimate uses and the systematic reversal of the burden of demonstrating that
legitimacy on users could therefore lead, in the short or long term, to a ‘chilling effect’ on
the freedom of expression and creation, resulting in a decrease in the activity of those users.”
(para. 187) Therefore, “adopting such preventive measures would […] risk causing
‘irreparable’ damage to freedom of expression” (para. 216)
181
In Nintendo v PC Box the Court put it slightly differently. After stating that the use
of “devices or activities which have a commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent the technical protection” cannot be prohibited under Article 6(2) InfoSoc
Directive, the Court went on to state “that legal protection [for technological protection
measures] is granted only with regard to technological measures which pursue the objective
of preventing or eliminating, as regards works, acts not authorised by the rightholder of
copyright […]. Those measures must be suitable for achieving that objective and must not
go beyond what is necessary for this purpose.” (CJEU, Judgment of 10 September 2013 in
Nintendo v PC Box, Case C-355/12, EU:C:2013:581, paras. 30-31).
182
Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, [2007] OJ C 303/17,
Explanation on Article 11 — Freedom of expression and information: the explanation states
that “Article 11 corresponds to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights”.
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in one provision can be explained with their common roots in the right to
freedom of expression, and it is also an indication of their related nature.183
Especially in relation to academic freedom, the Council of Europe and the
EU institutions have produced several Recommendations to shape the scope
of this right. 184 Intellectual property concerns do not play a prominent role in
these documents. 185 The freedom of scientific research is limited, but also
affirmed in principle by the Oviedo Convention on Human Rights in
Biomedicine and its four protocols. 186
The non-binding UNESCO Recommendation concerning the status of
Higher Education Teaching Personnel 187 sets out a list of elements that
constitute academic freedom, amongst them certain individual freedoms of
the teacher. 188 It states in its preamble that “teaching and research can only
be fully enjoyed in an atmosphere of academic freedom and autonomy for
institutions of higher education and that the open communication of findings,
hypotheses and opinions lies at the very heart of higher education and
provides the strongest guarantee of the accuracy and objectivity of
scholarship and research”. Research within the context of higher education is
defined as “original scientific, technological and engineering, medical,
cultural, social and human science or educational research which implies
careful, critical, disciplined inquiry, varying in technique and method
according to the nature and conditions of the problems identified, directed
towards the clarification and/or resolution of the problems, and when within
an institutional framework, supported by an appropriate infrastructure”.
Researchers within the scope of the Convention should “have access, without
censorship, to international computer systems, satellite programmes and
183

Debbie Sayers, ‘Article 13’, para 13.01 in Peers et al. supra (n 74).
Recommendation No. R (90) 3 of the Committee of Ministers of 6 February 1990
concerning Medical Research on Human Beings; Recommendation 1100 (1989) of the
Parliamentary Assembly of 2 February 1989 on the use of human embryos and foetuses in
scientific research; Recommendation 1762 (2006) of the Parliamentary Assembly of 30 June
2006 on ‘Academic freedom and university autonomy’; European Parliament, Defence of
academic freedom in the EU's external action, [2018] C 363/173.
185
The Recommendation No. R (2000) 8 of the Committee of Ministers of 30 March
2020 on the research mission of universities “Governments should encourage universities to
define clear rules for accepting, managing and accounting for funds from outside the
university. These should cover […] the allocation of income from intellectual property […].”
(9.8)
186
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (ETS No 164); Additional Protocol
to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with
regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning Human
Beings (ETS No. 168); Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin (ETS No.
186); Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning
Biomedical Research (CETS No. 195); Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes (CETS No. 203).
187
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
1997. Recommendation Concerning the Status of Higher Education Teaching Personnel
[hereinafter ‘UNESCO Recommendation’].
188
Cf. Debbie Sayers, ‘Article 13’, para. 13.29 in Peers et al. supra (n 74).
184
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databases required for their teaching, scholarship or research” 189 and
dissemination of research results should be encouraged “with a view to
promoting the advancement of science, technology, education and culture
generally.” 190
It is not difficult to read into these aspirational statements, which are
flanked by further recommendations that remain aspirational in most parts of
the world, a political will to facilitate research and to provide researchers with
the infrastructure and means, including the necessary information in form of
the scientific state of the art and other information, to conduct research
without restraint. The recommendations are precisely that, recommendations,
and little guidance is provided by these instruments on the interplay, or the
balance between academic freedom, the freedom of scientific research on the
one side, and intellectual property on the other. It is, however, possible, to
draw some conclusions from the general jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the
CJEU on the right to freedom of expression, freedom of scientific research
and the freedom of arts. 191 This systematic cross-pollination for the purpose
of defining the scope, including its limitations, of the right to scientific
freedom as an individual freedom but also as an integral element of academic
freedom, is permitted because all three rights and freedoms are contained in
one provision in the EUCFR, have the same roots in Article 10 ECHR and
are subject to the same limitations and restrictions.
In Commission v Hungary, the CJEU confirmed that academic freedom
has two dimensions, one institutional and one individual. 192 At individual
level, academic freedom largely falls under a qualified right to freedom of
expression, which grants researchers specific freedoms. Therefore, academic
freedom covers areas of artistic expression and scientific research 193 by
providing freedoms similar to those of journalists but also charges researchers
with specific responsibilities due to their special position not only as
researchers but also as educators. 194 The individual freedom of researchers is
therefore pronounced, but not limitless. The scope of the right to research is
likely broader than the institutionally limited academic freedom. 195 For
189

UNESCO Recommendation, IV.11.
UNESCO Recommendation, IV.12.
191
The freedom of the arts is probably the broadest of these rights and transcends, at
least to a certain extent, the classical understanding of art, giving it a special character, cf.,
Eleni Polymenopoulou, Does one Swallow Make a Spring? Artistic and Literary Freedom at
the European Court of Human Rights, 16 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 511, 535-538 (2016).
192
CJEU, Judgment of 6 October 2020 Commission v Hungary (Higher Education), C66/18, EU:C:2020:792, para. 227, see Cf. Debbie Sayers, ‘Article 13’, para. 13.41 in Peers
et al. supra (n 74).
193
Debbie Sayers, ‘Article 13’, para. 13.60 in Peers et al., supra (n 74).
194
Cf. Debbie Sayers, ‘Article 13’, para. 13.55 in Peers et al., supra (n 74), see also
Hertel v. Switzerland, 59/1997/843/1049, 25 August 1998, para 22; in relation to the special
obligations of journalists who must act “in good faith in order to provide accurate and reliable
information in accordance with the ethics of journalism.” see Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v.
Hungary, Appl. no. 18030/11, 8 November 2016, para. 159.
195
Beiter et al., supra (n 25) , 169. Although recognized in national constitutions and
190
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example, academic researchers within the scope of academic freedom enjoy
rights that are qualified and only extent to the sphere of academic activity and
the researcher’s respective area of competence. 196 In general, the right to
“academic freedom in research and in training should guarantee freedom of
expression and of action, freedom to disseminate information and freedom to
conduct research and distribute knowledge and truth without restriction”. 197
It is notable that academic freedom and the freedom to research are also
closely linked to important aims and policy areas of the European Union
which must be taken into consideration as programmatic goals in the
interpretation and balancing of the right to scientific research and academic
freedom. 198 More recently, the 2021 Digital Europe Programme aspired to
“accelerate the digital transformation of the European economy, industry and
society” 199 and to “foster better exploitation of the industrial potential of
policies on innovation, research and technological development”. 200 The
Programme Digital Europe makes reference to the Paris Agreement, 201
adopted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, stating that

somewhat in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, a right to academic freedom is
not expressly contained in either the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or
the ICESCR, ibid 110.
196
ECtHR, Mustafa Erdoğan and Others v. Turkey, Appl. no. - 346/04 and 39779/04,
27 May 2014, para. 40, as adopted by Commission v Hungary (Higher Education) supra (n
192), para. 225.
197
ECtHR, Mustafa Erdoğan and Others v. Turkey, Appl. no. - 346/04 and 39779/04,
27 May 2014, para. 40.
198
The TFEU foresees a specific chapter on research policy (arts. 179-190), which is
aims at establishing a European Research Area (ERA). The ERA should enable the free
movement of researchers and scientific knowledge to promote “all the research activities
deemed necessary by virtue of other Chapters of the Treaties”. (art. 179) The ERA has been
consistently shaped by high-level policy programs, which includes mandatory open access
requirements for EU funded research (European Commission, Directorate-General for
Research and Innovation, Horizon Europe, open science: early knowledge and data sharing,
and
open
collaboration,
Publications
Office,
2021,
https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/79699) and supporting open access mechanisms (“The
European Open Science Cloud aims to build infrastructures to provide seamless access to
FAIR data and interoperable services for the scientific community”
recently
(https://ec.europa.eu/research/openscience/index.cfm?pg=open-science-cloud),
confirmed in Note from Permanent Representatives Committee to Council, Conclusions on
research assessment and implementation of open science, Brussels, 25 May 2022 (9515/22).
See also: Commission, A European strategy for data, Brussels, 19.2.2020, COM(2020) 66
final, Appendix under 10; see also Commission, Cloud Initiative - Building a competitive
data and knowledge economy in Europe, Brussels, 19.4.2016, and Commission Staff
Working Document - Implementation Roadmap for the EOSC, Brussels, 14.3.2018,
SWD(2018) 83 final.)
199
Regulation (EU) 2021/694 establishing the Digital Europe Programme and repealing
Decision (EU) 2015/2240 [2021] OJ L 166/1, art. 3.
200
Ibid, art. 9, see also rec. 16.
201
Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
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“[t]he Programme should be implemented in a manner that fully respects the
Union and international framework of intellectual property protection and
enforcement. The effective protection of intellectual property plays a key role
in innovation and is, therefore, necessary for the effective implementation of
the Programme.” 202
3. Freedom to Conduct a Business
The freedom to conduct a business is one of the economic fundamental
rights of the EUCFR. It is closely connected, and originally derived from
national expression of the right to property (Article 17 EUCFR) and the
freedom to choose an occupation and to engage in work (Article 15 EUCFR).
It guarantees the freedom of entrepreneurs as an individual rights and is
reflective of the EU’s economic constitution as an open market economy with
free competition. 203
The freedom to conduct a business as an individual fundamental right 204
first appeared in the European legal order in Nold, when the CJEU derived it
form the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, in this case
the right to the free pursuit of business activity protected by the German Basic
Law. 205 Amongst the elements that constitute this right most crucial for
copyright is the right to contract, which can only be limited under certain
circumstances. 206
Its scope is broad and covers every economic activity and guarantees the
right of a business to dispose freely of its resources of an economic, technical
and financial character. 207 Its scope also includes the right of an undertaking
to choose with whom to enter into a contract, or in general, with whom to do
business. 208 The scope however is easily restricted by national or EU

202

Ibid rec. 61, The Programme also encourages open source-solutions with the aim to
improve the sustainability of funded projects (rec. 54)
203
See art 119(1) TFEU, see Michelle Everson and Rui Correira Gonçalves, ‘Article
16’, paras. 16.11-12 in Peers et al. supra (n 74).
204
Cf. Everson/Correira Gonçalves, ‘Article 16’, paras. 16.05-06 in Peers et al. supra (n
74).
205
Nold supra (n 85), paras. 12-13. Already in Nold, the CJEU qualified the right to
property, or any proprietary rights for that purpose with the social function of property: “If
rights of ownership are protected by the constitutional laws of all the Member States and if
similar guarantees are given in respect of their right freely to choose and practice their trade
or profession, the rights thereby guaranteed, far from constituting unfettered prerogatives,
must be viewed in the light of the social function of the property and activities protected
thereunder.” (para. 14).
206
CJEU, Judgment of 16 January 1979 Sukkerfabriken Nykøbing, C-151/78,
EU:C:1979:4, see also CJEU, Judgment of 5 October 1999 Spain v Commissiom, C-240/97,
EU:C:1999:479.
207
UPC Telekabel Wien supra (n 176), para. 49. On the relation between intellectual
property and freedom to conduct a business see Gustavo Ghidini & Stazi Andrea, Freedom
to conduct a business, competition and intellectual property, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 410 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015).
208
CJEU, of 27 April 1994 Almelo and Others v. Energiebedrijf IJsselmij, C-393/92,
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measures. Early in its case-law on Article 16 EUCFR, the CJEU therefore
underlined in Sky Österreich that, like the right to property, the freedom to
conduct a business can be restricted in pursuance of “an objective of general
interest”. 209
This case is also of particular relevance for arguing for a right to research
in the sense of an access right. In this case, the CJEU had to rule on the
legality of a national rule implementing Directive 2010/13, 210 obliging
broadcasters to give access to their broadcasts on fair reasonable and nondiscriminatory conditions. This obligation to grant access was granted by
virtue of national law to enable other broadcasters to use excepts for the
purpose of reporting on events of high interest to the public in the context of
short news reports. 211 The rule clearly constituted a violation of the right to
property under Article 17(2) EUCFR in form of a compulsory license, and it
was argued before the Court that the obligation to contract would also
constitute a violation of Article 16. The CJEU found that the limitation of
both fundamental rights was proportionate. The Court stressed that licensing
broadcasts on an exclusive basis, conserving contractual freedom for
rightholders, would prevent the public from gaining access to information on
current events. 212 The Court stated further that “[i]n the light, first, of the
importance of safeguarding the fundamental freedom to receive information
and the freedom and pluralism of the media guaranteed by Article 11 of the
Charter and, second, of the protection of the freedom to conduct a business
as guaranteed by Article 16 of the Charter, the European Union legislature
was entitled […] to give priority, in the necessary balancing of the rights and
interests at issue, to public access to information over contractual
freedom.” 213 In coming to this conclusion, the CJEU underlines that Article
15 of Directive 2010/13 provided that broadcasters could charge fees for the
provision of access to their broadcasts under a set of clearly defined
conditions. 214
Considering Sky Österreich it is undoubtable that copyright can be made
subject to limitations and exceptions that restrict the right to contractual
freedom of rightholders. A duty to contract by way of compulsory licenses or
remunerated statutory exceptions would be permitted, as long as they comply
with the general conditions of Article 51(2) EUCFR. For that purpose,
limitations to the any fundamental right must be foreseen by law, respect the
EU:C:1994:171, para. 32 and Sky Österreich supra (n 97), paras. 42-43.
209
Sky Österreich supra (n 97), paras. 44-46; with reference to the right to property the
judgment states that “the freedom to conduct a business is not absolute, but must be viewed
in relation to its social function […]”.
210
Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law,
regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual
media services, [2010] OJ L 95/1.
211
See Articles 15(1) and (6) of Directive 2010/13/EU.
212
Sky Österreich supra (n 97), para. 65.
213
Sky Österreich supra (n 97), para. 66 (emphasis added).
214
Sky Österreich supra (n 97), paras. 63-64.
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essence of the right affected and comply with the principle of
proportionality. 215 The same standard has also been applied, albeit more
implicitly, in a number of cases on the extent to which intermediaries can
required to stop and prevent copyright infringements online. 216
4. The right to (Intellectual) Property
The right to property in Europe is guaranteed by Art. 1, First Protocol to
the ECHR and Art. 17 EUCFR. The ECHR is more general in its scope an
subsumes, as clarified by the case-law of the ECtHR intellectual property
under the general guarantee of property as “the peaceful enjoyment of […]
possessions”. 217 A more express protection of intellectual property provides
the EUCFR by stating that “[i]ntellectual property shall be protected”. 218 The
protection is, of course, not absolute, especially considering the utilitarian or
social function of copyright in particular. Neither European fundamental
rights catalogue provides for a definition of the scope of protection, or what
intellectual property is for the purposes of the Charter or the Convention.
However, both instrument state that the right to property can be subject to
limitations. Under the ECHR “[n]o one shall be deprived of his possessions
except in the public interest” and any interference with the right to property
must be provided for by law. 219 Under the EU Charter, the general norm to
limit fundamental right under Article 51 EUCRF applies to limitations of the
right to property.
In its early case-law on the free movement of goods the CJEU recognized
215

Cf. Sky Österreich supra (n 97), para. 48.
See Geiger & Jütte, supra (n 76), 525-526.
217
The ECtHR confirmed that the right to property also includes intellectual property in
the scope of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR, in ECtHR Anheuser-Busch Inc. v.
Portugal, Appl. no 73049/01, 11 January 2007; British-American Tobacco Company v The
Netherlands, Appl. no. 19589/92, 20 November 1995; in relation to copyright see AsDAC v.
Republic of Moldova, Appl. no. 47384/07, 8 December 2020, see also Fredrik Neij and Peter
Sunde Kolmisoppi (The Pirate Bay) v. Sweden, Appl.no. 40397/12, 19 February 2013 and
Ashby Donald and other v France, Appl. no. 36769/08, 10 January 2013; see Torremans,
‘Article 17(2)’, paras. 17(2).30-33 in Peers et al. supra (n 74).
218
EUCFR, art. 17(2); commenting critically are Christophe Geiger, Intellectual
Property shall be protected!? Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union: a mysterious provision with an unclear scope, 31 E.I.P.R. 113, 116 (2009);
Jonathan Griffiths & McDonagh Luke, Fundamental rights and European IP law: the case
of Art 17(2) of the EU Charter, in CONSTRUCTING EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEW PERSPECTIVES 75 (Christopher Geiger ed., 2013); Alain Strowel,
Copyright strengthened by the Court of Justice interpretation of Article 17(2) of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights, in COPYRIGHT AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL
AGE. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN SEARCH OF A COMMON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 28,
28 (Oreste Pollicino, Giovanni Maria Riccio & Marco Bassini eds., 2020); Torremans,
‘Article 17(2)’, paras. 17(2).39-41 in Peers et al., supra (n 74), suggesting that the protection
of intellectual property rights as private rights must be inherently weaker as opposed to
broader public interest must be resolved by balancing these rights against each other by way
of a reconciliation of the various rights and interests.
219
Council of Europe, Protocol 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 20 March 1952, ETS 9, art. 1(1).
216
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the necessity to limit the exercise of intellectual property rights in order to
ensure the functioning of the internal market. To realize one of the aims of
the Union, the internal market, 220 the CJEU has consistently limited the
exercise of territorial intellectual property rights in order to ensure the free
movement of goods and services between the Member States of the EU.221
Even before the introduction of the EU Charter, the Court denied the
applicability of Treaty restrictions of the free movement of goods on grounds
of “the protection of industrial and commercial property”. 222 Such limitations
one of the most prominent aims of the EU would only be possible to protect
“rights which constitute the essential subject-matter of such property.”223
This ‘essence’ of the various intellectual property rights has been constructed,
albeit not in a systematic manner, by the CJEU. 224 It becomes clear from the
CJEU’s case-law that copyright can be limited, and only a very serious
violation of the ‘essence’ or the specific subject-matter of copyright would
constitute an unjustifiable infringement of copyright as a fundamental
right. 225
Accordingly, the right to property is not an absolute right and can be
subject to restrictions. 226 Copyright protection as a property right under the
220

See above under I. B. 2.
For example, in Deutsche Grammophon the Court limited the exercise of the right of
phonogram producers to prevent the sale of phonogram copies in an EU Member States after
the copies had already been lawfully sold in another Member State, CJEU, Judgment of 8
June 1971 Deutsche Grammophon, 78/70, EU:C:1971:59, paras. 12-13.
222
TFEU, art. 36.
223
Deutsche Grammophon supra (n 213), para. 11. However, in Mc Fadden the Court
ruled that measures that serve to protect the rights of rightholders, for example by way of an
injunction directed against and internet access provider, must be effective in preventing
unauthorized access to protected works and subject matter, or if complete protection is not
possible without infringing unduly infringing other fundamental rights, make access to
protected content more difficult in order to potentially discourage users or at least make it
more difficult to access such content to the effect that users are discouraged, Mc Fadden
supra (n 95), para 95; see also UPC Telekabel Wien supra (n 176), para. 62.
224
See Husovec, supra (n 95), notably in FAPL/Murphy supra (n 79) the CJEU stated
that “the specific subject-matter of the intellectual property does not guarantee the right
holders concerned the opportunity to demand the highest possible remuneration.
Consistently with its specific subject-matter, they are ensured – as recital 10 in the preamble
to the Copyright Directive and recital 5 in the preamble to the Related Rights Directive
envisage – only appropriate remuneration for each use of the protected subject-matter.”
(para. 108). See also the Advocate General in YouTube/Cyando, when he stated that the
exclusive right of communication to the public as harmonized by Article 3(1) InfoSoc
Directive “does not necessarily have to be interpreted in a manner which
ensures maximum protection for rightholders.” (emphasis added) (AG Saugmandsgaard Øe,
Opinion of 16 July 2020 YouTube/Cyando, C‑683/18, EU:C:2020:586, paras. 238-239).
225
Cf. Bastei Lübbe supra (n 97), para. 46. However, it has been argued that Article
17(2) EUCFR “is void of any inviolable core understood as a red line which cannot be
bridged by any considerations of proportionality” and that “any reference to essence in the
case-law of the CJEU only points towards a higher level of scrutiny, but not towards an
untouchable core of rights that may not be abolished by the legislator”, Husovec, supra (n
95), 855.
226
See e.g. Pelham and others supra (n 79), para. 33; Funke Medien NRW supra (n 79),
221
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EUCFR and the ECHR is very much dictated by a balancing exercise built
around the assumption that intellectual property can be limited in the public
interest. 227 The CJEU, from its unique position as the prime interpreter of EU
law, has reserved the task of limiting copyright for the legislator and refused
to assume and exercise external control over the balance within copyright
law. 228 While the EUCFR does not distinguish between ‘real’ and intellectual
property, and despite the rather blunt statement that intellectual property
“shall be protected”, the balancing between the various rights and interests,
particularly in the light of the international obligations derived from Article
27 UDHR and Article 15 ICESCR, copyright could, and arguably must be
subject to restrictions that enable it to perform its inherently social
function. 229 At least in Europe, this balancing must primarily be performed
by the legislator. 230
I.

THE CONTOURS OF A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO RESEARCH

As we have seen, the imperative to strengthen arguments in favour of
research activities and their constitutional requirements is a result of a
combined reading of the aims and objectives of the European Union, a
commitment to regional and global sustainability and the interplay of several

para. 72; Spiegel Online supra (n 79), para. 56; Mc Fadden supra (n 95), para. 90; GS Media
supra (n 76), para. 45; Deckmyn supra (n 76), para. 26; UPC Telekabel Wien supra (n 176),
paras. 46-47; SABAM v Netlog supra (n 95), paras. 41-42; Scarlet Extended supra (n 95),
para. 44; Promusicae supra (n 97), para. 65.
227
See reference in Luksan supra (n 76), para. 68; see Sganga, supra (35).
228
See the CJEU’s judgements in Funke Medien NRW supra (n 79); Pelham and others
supra (n 79); Spiegel Online supra (n 79), although the Advocate General in Pelham
suggested that in exceptional cases an external review of existing copyright law could be
warranted: “That balancing exercise must, in a democratic society, be undertaken first of all
by the legislature, which embodies the general interest. The legislature enjoys a broad margin
of discretion in that regard. The application of legislative solutions is then subject to the
control of the courts which are in turn responsible for ensuring compliance with fundamental
rights in the context of that application to specific cases. However, except in exceptional
cases, that control must normally be undertaken within the limits of the applicable provisions
enjoying a presumption of validity, including with regard to fundamental rights. If only one
solution were considered compatible with fundamental rights, the margin of discretion of the
legislature would be zero.” (references omitted), Pelham and Others supra (n 98), para. 94,
see, Jütte, supra (152), 468.
229
See Geiger, supra (4), 77-80, the social function as a balancing mechanism reaches
further than ‘pure’ property relations, but permeates private law relations to the effect that
“[the] right of the individual are not seen as an absolute right but rather as rights limited in
social terms.”. See further Caterina Sganga & Silvia Scalzini, From abuse of right to
European copyright misuse: a new doctrine for EU copyright law, 48 IIC 405, 426 (2016),;
the authors distil from the terminology used in EU legislation the indication that absolute
protection is not granted to rightholders, but that the definition of the scope of the rights, and
even the granting of exclusive rights themselves serves social and cultural functions; see
further CATERINA SGANGA, PROPERTIZING EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT 227 ff. (2018).
230
In the EU, this prerogative rests largely with the EU legislator in order to avoid a
disharmonious development of copyright in the EU Member states, see e.g. Spiegel Online
supra (n 79), para. 47.
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human rights recognized at European and international level. We shape the
contours of this right in relation to copyright law, but we suggest that the
underlying Gedankenspiel can also serve to transplant similar arguments into
other areas.
A right to research as we propose would not undermine the “credibility
of the human rights tradition”, but reflects a “dynamic approach” to consider
“changing needs and perspectives and responds to the emergence of new
threats to human dignity and well-being.” 231 Concretely, a right to research
would enable access to information to conduct research to help realize other
core fundamental rights and to work towards a more sustainable future.
A right to research that would influence copyright policy and, as a result,
copyright rules, their interpretation and application must be defined in three
main dimensions to be effective and fulfill its function as an enabler of
research activities.
A. Personal
The right to research should not be limited to a particular institutional
context to a specific professional background. To put it simply, not only
university professors conduct research, but also non-academic researchers,
commercial enterprises and even private individuals, alone or collectively.
That does not mean that all of these groups should enjoy the same privileges,
but they should all be enabled to access necessary information freely, and if
necessary, against remuneration. The right to research should have a similar
scope to that of the right to scientific research. With its underlying purpose
to support research with a copyright system that incentivizes research, the
right’s scope should be broad. This is in line with the EU’s aims, read in the
light of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, which require research not
only by publicly funded institutions. Instead, technological progress and
scientific discoveries in theory and in practice must be supported in the public
and private sphere, and ideally at the intersection of public and private
research. As we will expand further below, research-enabling copyright rules
should not distinguish in their general application between public and private
or commercial and non-commercial users. 232
B. Substantive
A right to research should be aimed at facilitating access to information.
Compared to the right to freedom of expression, thereby partially
distinguishing it from its scope, the right to research has its focus on the right
to receive and process information. Acts of reproduction are required to
collect and digest, intellectually and technologically, information to further

231

Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78
AM J INT LAW 607, 609 (1984) .
232
Compare application of research exception under Article 5 InfoSoc and Article 3.-4
TDM exception
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our understanding of science and technology, but more important in an
information society, to generate new analytical insights from large amounts
of data. In this context the more important prong of a right to research is its
access function. Whereas the right protected under Article 11 EUCFR is a
right to receive and impart information, a right to research is a right to access
and use copyrighted protected work to collect and analyze information 233. Or
to out in other words, Article 11 protects a right to actively and passively
communicate, whereas a right to research would guarantee for researchers a
right to obtain, process, store and share information for research purposes,
including when this requires copyright relevant actions.
C. Geographic
Research today is not conducted hermitically by individual researchers
but is an interconnected activity with interpersonal and international
dimensions. A right to must reflect this. Human rights are global and
European fundamental rights have a regional reach. The right to freedom of
expression already underlines its borderless nature, as is reflected in
jurisprudence of the European Courts on the importance of the internet as a
delocalized communication infrastructure. A right to research must equally
support cross-border collaboration, 234 and potentially, also an aspiration to
support global exchange of information for research purposes as a
counterweight not only to the exclusivity of copyright, but also its territorial
nature. A right to research should not be specifically defined to generate
cross-border effects, but it should be understood that it can only create the
desired changes in copyright law to the benefits of society if it enable the
exchange of information between researchers in different jurisdictions.
II.
THE NEED AND PLACE FOR A SPECIFIC, INDIVIDUALIZED
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO RESEARCH IN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
INSTRUMENTS
The emergence of new fundamental rights is not unprecedented, certainly
not in the EU legal order, 235 but also in the international human rights
framework. 236 A good example is the ‘freedom to conduct a business’ which
233

See on this issue, the references supra note…
Cf. for example Laurence R. Helfer, Molly K. Land & Ruth L. Okediji, Copyright
Exceptions Across Borders: Implementing the Marrakesh Treaty, 42 E.I.P.R. 332 (2020),
highlighting the importance of congruent exceptions at national level to enable the crossborder exchange of works (333).
235
Emily Hancox, The Relationship Between the Charter and General Principles:
Looking Back and Looking Forward, 22 CYELS 233–257 (2020), in particular the
development of fundamental rights out of general principles, which also maintain an
important position in the constitutional order of EU law, leaves room for ne emerging
fundamental rights at this level.
236
See Alston, supra (n 231), 611-614, amongst these rights is the right to development
and the right to a clean environment, both of which would be strongly supported by a right
to research. The Declaration on the Right to Development (GA Res. 41/128 (1986)) states
that “[t]he right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every
234

WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP

PIJIP RESEARCH PAPER NO. 77

46

has been developed by the European courts and which eventually found its
way as a concretely expressed fundamental right into the EUCFR. 237 But
there is of course caution to be exercised when “conjuring up” new
fundamental or human rights out of the mist of general principles, national
constitutions and their constitutional traditions. Simply the ‘want’ for a new
right is insufficient to argue for the perpetual anchoring of a new right in the
Olymp of privileged values – and indeed human rights are hardly ever
revoked. There have also been criticisms of the dangers of ‘rights talk’ as a
potential for an escalation of political and judicial discourse. 238
We argue that an express recognition of an individualized a right to
research is indeed necessary. Furthermore, its crystallization out of existing
rights is not a revolutionary leap, it merely spells out what has been hiding in
the shadows. 239 Formulating a right to research as its own, self-standing right
would merely give contours to what effectively already exists as elements in
other fundamental rights. The right sits in the middle of a fundamental rights
Venn diagram of existing fundamental right.
One could reasonably argue that a de facto existing right deserves its own
label, and the question is of course also a political one. The right to research
does not cover an obvious lacuna in international human rights or European
fundamental rights, one might therefore argue that its inclusion is not strictly
human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy
economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.” (art. 1) To realize the right “states have the
primary responsibility for the creation of national and international conditions favourable to
the realization of the right to development.” (art. 3) Prior instances in which the right to
research was mentioned, without any further specification of its substance, included GA
Res. 34/46 (1979) (“the right to development is a human right”, identical in GA Res. 35/174
(1980), GA Res. 36/133 (1981) “the right to development is and inalienable human right”),
identical in GA Res. 37/199 and as a participatory right in GA Res. 37/200 (“”everyone has
the right to participate in, as well as to benefit from, the development process”. On the
development of the right to development see Nico Schrijver, A new Convention on the human
right to development: Putting the cart before the horse?, 38 NETHERLANDS QUARTERLY OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 84 (2020), the author further remarks on the right to development that “the
added value of formulating and recognising the right to development lies not so much in its
novel features or individual parts but rather in the sum of its parts and its integrative value”,
stressing that the substance of a right to development is already contains in a number of
fundamental rights included in global and regional human rights treaties (92).
237
See also on the gradual development of the right to data protection in the EU: MariePierre Granger & Irion Kristina, The right to protection of personal data: the new posterchild
of European Union citizenship?, in CIVIL RIGHTS AND EU CITIZENSHIP 279, (Sybe de Vries,
Henri de Waele & Marie-Pierre Granger eds., 2018).
238
Cf. Carys J. Craig, Globalizing User Rights-Talk: On Copyright Limits and
Rhetorical Risks, 33 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1 (2017).
239
See for comparison the argument for a right to development as a “cluster right” that
is composed out of existing fundamental right, including “[t]he right to a decent standard of
living, including the right to food, water, clothing and housing, the right to work, the right to
education, the right to life, and the right to freedom of expression and organisation, are a
cluster of rights that together form a ‘human right to development’”, Schrijver, supra (n 236),
92.
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necessary. But its inclusion would highlight societal developments and the
necessity of sustainable human progress at a particular and critical point in
time. Societal necessity suggests, even commands that we assign specific
importance to research as an activity without which other recognized human
rights will most likely not be realizable in the near future.
Positioning the right in existing rights-catalogues is of secondary concern,
but of equal importance. Once the decisions to give concrete expression to a
right, its positioning will determine its interrelations with other rights, its
normative value and the general scope of its application. A right to research,
to promote a more open and research-permitting copyright system, must be
established not only at regional level. As a normative statement to underline
its societal significance at a global level, the right must also be implemented
at the highest international level. The effects of this new constellation must,
in any case transpire to the national level, because national parliaments are
where legislation is made – copyright law in particular. A positioning of this
newly formulated right as binding principle for legislator would safeguard
that it unfolds its beneficial effects on copyright law. In the EU, where
copyright is largely within the Union’s competence, the EUCFR is the
appropriate locus of a right to research, which does not mean that the right
should not be directly recognized in international and other regional
instruments. We propose therefore, that a right to research should be given
concrete expression in the ICESCR as well as the EUCFR.
To avoid the escalation of a ‘conflicts of interest’ between different
fundamental rights, we suggest an ‘individualized right to research’ which is
context-specific to avoid the danger that it radiates into other fundamental
rights. For example, we do not suggest that a right to research should, at any
stage come in conflict with the right to life. The tension between a right to
research and a right to (intellectual) property would be most appropriately
resolved close or within the relevant rights. That also means that the location
of the right as proposed here, would limit the effects of its introduction to
copyright and would largely insulate other areas from its reach.
At international level a revision of Article 15(1)(c) ICESCR could
promote a right to research as a counterweight to intellectual property. For
that purpose, the ‘right’ to moral and material interests’ could be deleted from
the ‘rights’ section under Article 15(1) ICESCR. Instead, a purpose-bound
obligation in form of a concrete instruction to ensure an appropriate level of
protection of the moral and material interests of rightholders would be
inserted into the second paragraph.
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A reformulated Article 15 would look as follows:
Current Text
1. The States Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right of
everyone:
(a) To take part in cultural life;

(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific
progress and its applications;
(c) To benefit from the protection of
the moral and material interests
resulting from any scientific, literary
or artistic production of which he is
the author.

2. The steps to be taken by the
States Parties to the present
Covenant to achieve the full
realization of this right shall include
those necessary for the conservation,
the development and the diffusion of
science and culture.

Proposed Text
1. The States Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right of
everyone:

(a) To actively take part in cultural
life;

(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific
progress and its applications;
(c) To benefit from the protection of
the moral and material interests
resulting from any scientific, literary
or artistic production of which he is
the author.
c) to actively conduct research for
cultural advancement and scientific
progress

2. The steps to be taken by the States
Parties to the present Covenant to
achieve the full realization of this
right shall include those necessary
for
the
conservation,
the
development and the diffusion of
science and culture, which shall
include an appropriate protection
for authors in relation to their
moral and material interests
resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production.

The result of this intervention would be the relegation of the protection
of the moral and material interests to a mandatory intervention for member
states to ensure the realization of the rights established by Article 15(1)(a)
and (b). A right to research by way of a positive obligation as means, rather
than an individual right would shift the balance within Article 15 ICESCR by
establishing a clear hierarchy. The rights of authors would be reshaped into
an instrument to achieve a social purpose. To stress the importance of the
right to research, not only as a right of passive enjoyment, but as an explicitly
right to positive action, a right to participate actively and without barriers for
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a specific set of purposes including research could be added.
At European level the integration of an express right to research is a bit
more complicated. No provision of the ECHR or the CFREU currently hosts
an obvious provision for integrating a new right to research. By way of
example, in the EU fundamental rights order, potential ‘homes’ for a right to
research could be found in the freedom of arts and sciences, the right to
freedom of expression, or as a purposive qualification of the right to property.
One option is to integrate a right to research as a limitation to the right to
intellectual property under Article 17(2) EUCFR. Another option would be
to include a broader right to access information expressly in the right to
freedom of expression under Article 11 EUCFR. Finally, the freedom of the
arts and sciences could serve as a host for a research-specific qualification. 240
Deriving the right to research from these three rights, and potentially others,
it seems almost unjust to attach it to one of these sources. Such an approach
might even suggest that there is a center of gravity of a right to research, or a
place in the Charter where the right exists and takes form with a few
additions. And, of course, the dangers of a broad, self-standing right to
research should not be underestimated. However, hiding an individual as well
as collective claim to research that mandates reforming copyright law in
existing property guarantees could also carry with it significant dangers.
Without a complete overhaul of the Charter, the most appropriate place
for a guarantee for research is therefore Article 11. In a redrafted right to
“Freedom of expression and information” research would be anchored as an
express right. The reformulated Article would look as follows:

240

See for a detailed explanation of similar options for a more balanced and ethical
foundation for intellectual property in European fundamental rights: Christophe Geiger,
Building an Ethical Framework for Intellectual Property in the EU: Time to Revise the
Charter of Fundamental Rights, in REFORMING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
[forthcoming] (Gustavo Ghidini & Valeria Falce eds., 2022), available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3938873.
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Proposed Text

Article 11

Article 11

Freedom of expression and
information

Freedom of expression and
information

1. Everyone has the right to freedom
of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and
ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers.

1. Everyone has the right to freedom
of expression. This right shall
include:

a. the right to hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and
ideas without interference by public
2. The freedom and pluralism of the authority and regardless of frontiers;
media shall be respected.
b. the right to seek information and to
conduct research to promote the
progress of science and technology,
culture and learning
2. The freedom and pluralism of the
media shall be respected.

In the new Article 11, the existing norm is supplemented by an insertion
in its first paragraph that expressly recognizes the right to seek information
for a specific set of purposes. The right is inherently limited by Article 52(2),
which replicates, in essence, the limitation to Article 10 ECHR. The insertion
elevates ‘research’ to the status of a full fundamental right as component of
freedom of expression. It is therefore not limited by institutional contexts, as
is the case with the freedom of the arts and sciences. Most importantly, it puts
the right to intellectual property explicitly codified in Article 17(2) EUCFR
into perspective. The conflict between both rights can now be appropriately
resolved through Article 52(2) and a proportionality analysis.
III.

RESHAPING COPYRIGHT FOR RESEARCH

We suggest that a right to research properly constructed can serve as an
argument in an orderly dialogue between other interests and fundamental
rights that inform copyright debates on its systematic structure, but also its
interpretation by the courts. For our purposes, as we will illustrate in this
section, a right to research provides reasons for reasonable adjustments in
copyright law. A weakening, or even a complete eradication of copyright as
an institution would not be tenable under either international or European
human and fundamental rights. In particular, if the respect of a certain degree
of the rights of authors is written into the constituent documents of
international human rights law and the European fundamental rights canon,
they are not conceived as inflexible and absolute entitlements to control
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remuneration and access, 241 or the latter for the purpose of the former. A
fundamental right granted should not be taken away, but it can be reconceived
or altered to give full effect to other rights.
Adding a fundamental right to the existing ones can be a justified
intervention to clarify or recalibrate the balance that seems to have gotten lost
through excessive, or ill-conceived interventions by national and regional
legislators. In this sense, we make four suggestions to illustrate the potential
effects of a right to research, largely based on examples taken from European
copyright law. This is not to say that such changes are not necessary in other
areas of copyright law, but such analyses simply go beyond the scope of this
paper. We do consider, however, that changes to international copyright
instruments could work well to underline the importance of a new (research)
theme in copyright law to reassess the normative values and preferences
underlying the international copyright framework. 242 We depart in our
consideration from the notion of copyright as an access right, that promoted
access to information, instead of prevention and exclusivity as main drivers
of copyright rule-making and -interpretation.
A. Copyright as an Access Right: General Considerations
The idea of copyright as an access right has gained traction as a counter
movement to investment-based rationales for the protection of copyright. 243
241

See Marcella Favale, The Right of Access in Digital Copyright: Right of the Owner
or Right of the User?, 15 JWIP 1, 14 (2012), who argues that the extension of copyright
protection to technological protection measures in Europe goes beyond what is required
under the international copyright treaties, including Article 11 WCT. The author also
employs a human rights reasoning to argue that copyright as an access right, that serves the
objectives set out in Article 27 UDHR and Article 15 ICESCR, cannot restrict acts that are
expressly permitted by copyright exceptions and limitations. In light of international human
rights law and European fundamental rights, copyright access control by rightholders must
be limited to the extent that the “ultimate goal of copyright, the circulation of culture” can
still be realized. The reward function of copyright must be designed by lawmakers within
the limits set by copyright’s purpose. Specifically on the balance between ‘paracopyright’
(see for an explanation of the term Animesh Ballabh, Paracopyright, 30 E.I.P.R. 138 (2008))
see Intergovernmental Copyright Committee, ‘The new challenges of striking the right
balance between copyright protection and access to knowledge, information and culture’,
IGC(1971)XIV/4,
Paris,
8
march
2010,
available
at:
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000187683.
242
See for example the proposal of a group of international intellectual property scholars
for an international instrument on permitted uses in copyright law, in which they include
research amongst the objectives of a social, political and cultural nature, for which the an
exception, or more general, a permitted use, should be foreseen in national laws: Reto M.
Hilty et al., International Instrument on Permitted Uses in Copyright Law, 52 IIC 62, 65
(2021).
243
Geiger, supra (n 4) access, 189-109, see also in this sense: Geiger, supra (n 4);
Christophe Geiger, The future of copyright in Europe: striking a fair balance between
protection and access to information, I.P.Q. 1 (2010); CHRISTOPHE GEIGER (ED.),
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO SCIENCE AND CULTURE: CONVERGENCE OR
CONFLICT?, advocating against copyright maximalism is Tawfik, supra (n 39), 301.305;
employing similar arguments, Chon suggests understanding intellectual property as part of
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Common to this understanding of copyright as a right to manage access to
works, and eventually information is the understanding that copyright serves
a purpose. The extent to which copyright grants protection and the extent to
which copyright exceptions and other mechanisms, such as technological
protection measures, manage access to knowledge must be designed to serve
copyright’s purpose.
The main purpose, which is reflected in the various norms of international
human rights and European fundamental rights law is to promote the progress
of the arts and sciences, cultural and technological participation. The
protection of copyright is not “an end in itself”. 244 Instead it serves a
particular purpose, which is to realize specific goals. Besides the objectives
expressly mentioned in the UDHR, the ICESCR, the EU Charter and the
ECHR, we must also consider larger societal objectives. They are expressed
in the EU’s founding treaties, as aims and objectives of internal market
harmonization, but these goals are also to be found in international
intellectual property discourses.
Whether it is sustainability, sustainable development, 245 or well-being, 246
these global objectives promote an understanding of copyright as a right that
facilitates access to information as a regulatory imperative. Admittedly,
global, societal and development considerations in intellectual property
discourses are nothing new, but the introduction of these notions into an
argument for a right to research reinforces the case for a more open copyright
system that promotes the generation of knowledge and facilitates access to
that knowledge.
B. Specific Considerations
Beyond a general shift in an understanding of copyright towards a right
that is designed by the legislature to enable access to information, and which
exists to realize fundamental rights and societal goals, current copyright rules
should be examined. The areas we consider below are examples of copyright
mechanisms or specific rights that would benefit of a rethinking in light of a
right to research. They are also symptomatic of failures to properly consider
the interest of researchers in the past. The examples selected, far from being
“global knowledge governance”, see Chon, supra (n 139), 764, see for a different
understanding of an ‘accessright’ instead of a ‘copyright’: Simon Olswang, Accessright: an
evolutionary path for copyright into the digital era, 17 E.I.P.R. 215 (1995), see on the
multiplicity of protection rationales and how they can be theoretically reconciled: Alexander
Peukert, Fictitious Commodities: A Theory of Intellectual Property Inspired by Karl
Polanyi’s “Great Transformation”, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J 1151
(2019) and Uma Suthersanen, Creativity, Pluralism, and Fictitious Narratives:
Understanding IP Law Through Karl Polanyi (April 12, 2022). QUEEN MARY LAW
RESEARCH PAPER NO. 381/2022, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4082273.
244
Alexander Peukert, Intellectual Property as an end in itself?, 33 E.I.P.R. 67 (2011).
245
Phillips, supra (139); Chon, supra (n 139); Abdel-Latif & Roffe, supra (n 139).
246
Estelle Derclaye, Happy IP: replacing the law and economics justification for
intellectual property rights with a well-being approach, 37 E.I.P.R. 197 (2015).
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exhaustive, are illustrative of recent changes, omissions or elements of
copyright law that are currently debated in the European Union.
1. The need for a general, open-ended exception for research
purposes
The malaise of European copyright exceptions is well documented.247
The pre-emptive effect of EU harmonization in the field of copyright
exceptions makes it unlawful for individual Member States to introduce
exceptions beyond those already included in Article 5 of the InfoSoc
Directive, 248 or the few contained in special instruments on the protection of
computer programs or databases. Although a general research exception can
be implemented into national law, Member States are not obliged to do so.
2. A Right to Research requires a mandatory exception for research
purposes
The first point of critique – or more positively – and a starting point for
altering existing copyright rules is to make a research exception mandatory
throughout the EU. It can, of course, be argued, and convincingly so, that a
research exception should also be included in the international conventions,
starting with the Berne Convention, but also extending to other copyright
treaties. For the purposes of illustrating the effect of a right to research, a
regional approach will suffice 249.
A mandatory exception would eliminate the risk that disharmonious
implementations of a research exception will result in innovation-chillingeffects. This is particularly true in an area of the world which boasts an active
247
Since the introduction of the InfoSoc Directive the systematic deficits of Article 5, which
sets out a list of one mandatory and 20 optional exceptions, have been addressed regularly,
as has the unclear role of the three-step test, which has been adopted expressly in art. 5(5).
The basic setup of the directive was already criticized for failing to achieve effective
harmonization, see P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Why the Copyright Directive is unimportant, and
possibly invalid, 22 E.I.P.R. 499 (2000); Christophe Geiger and Franciska Schönherr,
Defining the Scope of Protection of Copyright in the EU: The Need to Reconsider the Acquis
regarding Limitations and Exceptions, in CODIFICATION OF EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW:
CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES 133 (Tatiana-Eleni Synodinou, ed. 2012); with specific
focus on the three-step test see Christophe Geiger, Right to Copy v. Three-Step Test, 6 CRI
7 (2005); Christophe Geiger, The Three-Step Test, a Threat to a Balanced Copyright Law?,
37 IIC 683 (2006); Christophe Geiger, The Role of the Three-Step Test in the Adaptation of
Copyright Law to the Information Society, UNESCO E-COPYRIGHT BULLETIN 1 (2007);
Herman Cohen Jehoram, Is there a hidden agenda behind the general non-implementation
of the EU three-step test?, 31 E.I.P.R. 408 (2009); Jonathan Griffiths, The “Three-Step-Test”
in European Copyright Law – Problems and Solutions, QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
OF LAW, LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 31/2009 1 (2009); Christophe Geiger, Daniel
J. Gervais & Martin Senftleben, The Three-Step-Test Revisited: How to Use the Test’s
Flexibility in national Copyright Law, 29 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 581 (2014).
248
Cf. Pelham, supra (n 79), para. 65.
249
See for a global overview of copyright exceptions for research purposes, Sean Flynn et
al., Research Exceptions in Comparative Copyright (2022), PIJIP/TLS Research Paper
Series No. 75, https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/75/

WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP

PIJIP RESEARCH PAPER NO. 77

54

research industry, with some of the largest pharmaceutical manufacturers in
the world, and some of the most important producers of technologies that will
be indispensable for a European and global move towards a more sustainable
future. Not only would a mandatory research exception with the same scope
provide legal certainty to researchers and innovators across Europe, it would
also enable cross-jurisdictional cooperation between researchers who rely on
the exchange of information. Copyright should not constitute an obstacle in
such an environment.
The effects of a harmonious copyright framework should also not be
underestimated to incentivize competitiveness between EU Member States.
A level playing field for copyright protection, or to put it differently, a level
playing field for access to information, can eradicate differences in regulatory
advantages. Of course, copyright is only one element that contributes to the
attractiveness of a jurisdiction for innovation- and research-intensive
industries, but one that should not be underestimated.
3. A right to research requires a broad research exception
The current research exception of Article 5(3)(a) is clumped together with
an exception for teaching. It permits reproductions and potentially acts of
communication to the public “for the sole purpose of illustration for teaching
or scientific research, as long as the source, including the author's name, is
indicated, unless this turns out to be impossible and to the extent justified by
the non-commercial purpose to be achieved”. 250 Its scope is narrow and does
not support the broad research mission reflected in the aims and objectives of
the EU or the imperatives of sustainable development.
First the exception is limited to scientific research, which could be
interpreted to mean that industrial research or applied research is not covered
by the exception. Although it could be argued that the scope could be broader
to include research at the fringes of science, a clear definition of the scope
could provide the legal certainty necessary to provide for research-friendly
legal framework. The limitation of a remuneration-free exception to
‘scientific’ research suggests that all other types of research would have to be
based on licensing solutions to use protected material.
This concern links in with the second problematic condition of Article
5(3)(a), namely that the exception applies only to non-commercial research.
This significant limitation overlooks the fact that most of the research is
conducted by private companies for indirectly, but largely directly
commercial purposes.
A broader research exception must be technologically neutral to enable
research with different types of data and with different methodologies. It must
extend to a variety of uses of protected works and other subject matter to

250

See Senftleben (n 1), suggesting, amongst other things, to clarify that the ‘illustration’
requirement only applies to teaching activities
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allow for the progressive of science and technology to achieve the goals set
out in Article 3 TEU and in particular those that relate to the realization of
the internal market. A broad research exception should incentivize risktaking, but these risks should be confined to potential outcomes of research
endeavours and not in the form of potential legal liability. In other words, a
broadly expressed research exception must enable researchers to work with
data and information to contribute to scientific and technological
advancement to work toward a more sustainable and socially just internal
market in the EU, an eventually for global societies. And, of course, the idea
of a broad research exception should eventually not be confined to the EU’s
internal market but should work to the benefits of researchers that cooperate
with counterparts in the EU, or individually or in groups around the globe.
4. Specific TDM Exception
The recent introduction of a text and data-mining (TDM) exception in
Articles 3 and 4 of the CDSM Directive remedies some of the shortcomings
of the general research exception under Article 5(3)(a) InfoSoc Directive. It
was indeed, introduced to “benefit the research community and, in so doing,
support innovation.” 251 However, the new exception itself is not without
flaws and underlines some of the existing systemic deficiencies of copyright
law 252. In general, a specific exception for TDM should be welcomed as it
clarifies the lawfulness of TDM in principle. However, the definition of the
scope raises further problems, but also shows the way forward.
The exception of Article 3 CDSM Directive is mandatory but is limited

251
CDSM Directive, rec. 8. For a comment see Christophe Geiger, Giancarlo Frosio &
Oleksandr Bulayenko, Text and Data Mining: Articles 3 and 4 of the Directive 2019/790/EU,
in PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL Y MERCADO ÚNICO DIGITAL EUROPEO 27 (Conception Saiz
Garcia & Raquel Evangelio Llorca, eds., 2019).
252
See in this regard Christophe Geiger, Giancarlo Frosio & Oleksandr Bulayenko, THE
EXCEPTION FOR TEXT AND DATA MINING (TDM) IN THE PROPOSED DIRECTIVE ON
COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET - LEGAL ASPECTS, Study for the DirectorateGeneral for Internal Policies of the Union, Department of Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional
Affairs, European Parliament, February 2018. For a critical evaluation of the Directive
proposal, see also Christophe Geiger, Giancarlo Frosio & Oleksandr Bulayenko, Text and
Data Mining in the Proposed Copyright Reform: Making the EU Ready for an Age of Big
Data?, 49 IIC 814 (2018), Christophe Geiger, Giancarlo Frosio & Oleksandr Bulayenko The
EU Commission’s Proposal to Reform Copyright Limitations: A Good but Far Too Timid
Step in the Right Direction, 40 E.I.P.R. 4 (2018); European Copyright Society, General
Opinion on the EU Copyright Reform Package, 24 January 2017, p. 5, availabl at:
https://europeancopyrightsocietydotorg.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/ecs-opinion-on-eucopyright-reform-def.pdf; Reto M. Hilty & Heiko Richter, Part B: Copyright Exceptions and
Limitations
Chapter
1:
Text
and
Data
Mining
(Article 3 COM(2016) 593 final), in: (eds.), MODERNISATION OF THE EU COPYRIGHT RULES,
POSITION STATEMENT OF THE MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION
25 (Reto M. Hilty & Valeria Moscon, eds., 2017); Nicolas Jondet, L’exception pour le data
mining dans le projet de directive sur le droit d’auteur - Pourquoi l’Union européenne doit
aller plus loin que les legislations des Etats membres, PROPR. INTELL. 25 (2018.
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to “research organisations and cultural heritage institutions”. 253 Only Article
4 of the Directive also applies to primarily commercial research, but this
exception is more limited in its scope. While Article 3 allows that extractions
and reproductions can be stored “with an appropriate level of security and
may be retained for the purposes of scientific research, including for the
verification of research results”, 254 Article 4 provides that data “may be
retained for as long as is necessary for the purposes of text and data
mining”. 255 More critically, the exception under Article 4 will only apply as
long as the use of works and other subject matter under the exception has not
been reserved by the relevant rightholder. CDSM Directive, art. 4(3). 256 Both
exceptions also differentiate between the types of works subject to the
exception. 257
Without going into further detail on the precise differences in scope,
already these three differences demonstrate the potential for chilling effects
in TDM-research. It is laudable that TDM received its own research
exceptions, because the application of the general research exception to TDM
was unclear. 258 However, the narrow scope of Article 3 and 4 creates
uncertainties, and, through the opt-out under Article 4(3), a limitation of
available mining-material can potentially frustrate research efforts or lead to
results that do not perfectly capture all relevant data.
The exception has been subject to substantive criticism 259 and a further
253

The limitation of the broader of the two TDM exceptions to specific institutions is
significant. The CDSM Directive defines ‘research organisation as “a university, including
its libraries, a research institute or any other entity, the primary goal of which is to conduct
scientific research or to carry out educational activities involving also the conduct of
scientific research” on either a “not-for-profit basis or by reinvesting all the profits in its
scientific research” or when that institution acts “pursuant to a public interest mission
recognised by a Member State” (art. 2(1)); a ‘cultural heritage institution’ is a “publicly
accessible library or museum, an archive or a film or audio heritage institution” (art. 2(3)).
The express limitations to institutions that operate on a non-for-profit basis or largely within
the public interest in the narrow sense enjoy broad TDM freedoms, as opposed to other actors
which are caught by Article 4 CDSM Directive.
254
CDSM Directive, art. 3(2).
255
CDSM Directive, art. 4(2).
256
CDSM Directive, art. 4(3).
257
The exception under Article 3 applies to the reproduction right as harmonized by the
InfoSoc Directive, as well as temporary reproductions of original databases under Article
5(a) Database Directive and extraction and re-utilization from and of sui generis databases
under Article 7(1) of the same directive, and the reproduction right in relation to press
publication granted by Article 15 CDSM Directive. The exception under Article 4 also
applies to certain exclusive rights granted under Article 4(1)(a) and (b) of the Software
Directive (Directive 2009/24/EC on the legal protection of computer programs, [2009] OJ L
111/16)
258
CDSM Directive, rec. 19.
259
See for example Christophe Geiger, The Missing Goal-Scorers in the Artificial
Intelligence Team: Of Big Data, the Fundamental Right to Research and the failed Text and
Data Mining Limitations in the CSDM Directive, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND SPORTS:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ 383 (Martin Senftleben et al. eds., 2021) and
Sean Flynn, Christophe Geiger & João Pedro Quintais, Implementing User Rights for
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development of TDM-freedoms in the EU would help to create a researchconducive environment for future technologies. 260
5. Statutory Remuneration Rights
The idea of remunerated exceptions has been discussed in relation to
derivative works, and statutory remuneration system already exist for other
exceptions. For example, private reproductions under Article 5(2(b) InfoSoc
Directive enable the unauthorized reproduction while ensuring that
rightholders do not suffer economic harm. Similarly, the use of works and
other subject matter protected by copyright in the context of cross-border
digital teaching activities can be made subject to mandatory licensing
mechanism under Article 5(2) CDSM Directive or subject to statutory
remuneration under Article 5(4).
Statutory remuneration has the advantage of circumventing authorization
requirement, and thereby to reduce transaction costs and the possibility of
potential access refusals 261. Similar proposals have been made in relation to
facilitating the use of protected subject matter for derivative works, 262 but
also for more general uses. 263 Because of their existence and the experience
national legislators have with remunerated statutory limitations, they could
be easily implemented and embedded in existing infrastructures at national

Research in the Field of Artificial Intelligence: A Call for International Action, 42 E.I.P.R
393 (2020).
260
See also Christophe Geiger, Giancarlo Frosio & Oleksandr Bulayenko, Crafting a
Text and Data Mining Exception for Machine Learning and Big Data in the Digital Single
Market, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIGITAL TRADE IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND BIG DATA. COLLECTION CEIPI/ICTSD, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND
CHALLENGES FOR THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM 95 (Xavier Seuba, Christophe
Geiger & Julien Pénin eds., 2018); Begona Gonzales Otero, Machine Learning Models
Under the Copyright Microscope: Is EU Copyright Fit for Purpose?, 70 GRUR INT. 1043
(2021). The European Commission has also stressed the importance of artificial intelligence,
for which text and data mining is essential, in its 2021 AI Strategy, introducing the Recovery
and Resilience Facility (RRF) which “will enable Europe to raise its ambitions and become
a first mover in adopting AI” as part of the EU’s recovery plan during Europe’s “Digital
Decade”. The RRF is expected to “boost Member States’ investments in AI and support
leading research, innovation and testing capacities, so that the accelerated development and
use of AI can contribute to economic and social recovery and improve competitiveness in
the longer term”, Commission, Fostering a European approach to Artificial Intelligence,
Brussels, 21.04.2021, COM(2021) 205 final, p. 2.
261
See Christophe Geiger and Oleksandr Bulayenko, Creating Statutory Remuneration
Rights in Copyright law: What Policy Options under the International Framework?, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORDERING BEYOND BORDERS (Axel Metzger and Henning Grosse
Ruse-Khan, eds. forthcoming 2022); Christophe Geiger, Promoting Creativity through
Copyright Limitations, Reflections on the Concept of Exclusivity in Copyright Law, 12
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 515 (2010).
262
Christophe Geiger, Freedom of Artistic Creativity and Copyright Law: A Compatible
Combination, 8 UCI L. REV. 413, 443 ff. (2018).
263
Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1383 (2014).
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level. 264
More importantly, such limitations could give concrete expression to the
social and innovation function of copyright and would be further justified by
the Union’s policies. Remunerated statutory limitations to exclusive rights
would ensure that within the objective of copyright information could be used
and reused to create and innovate to the benefit of society, while ensuring that
rightholders receive remuneration and keep incentivized not only to create
works but also to make them available to the public for use and re-use.
6. The Reform of Database Rights
The protection of databases under EU law has been criticized
vehemently265 since the adoption of the Database Directive. 266 Databases are
either protected as original databases, if they display originality in the
arrangement of the data, 267 or as sui generis databases, if the creation of the
database required significant investment in the collection of the data. 268 It is
the latter right that has borne the brunt of criticism. What started as a “unique
policy experiment” 269 provides rightholders in such databases a broad scope
of protection of unoriginal content in unoriginal form. What the right
protects, in other words, is gathering information, not creativity.
Protecting information contained in sets of data inevitable has effects on
264
In relation to the sui generis database right it has been suggested to introduce a system
of compulsory licensing that would require rightholder to offer licenses upon request, and
which would have to rely on a registration requirement to identify the relevant rightholders:
European Commission, Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and
Technology, Karanikolova, K., Chicot, J., Gkogka, A., et al., Study in support of the
evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases: final report,
Publications Office, 2018, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2759/04895, at 34. At international
level such compulsory licenses are foreseen, for example, in Article 9(2) Berne Convention.
At EU level, compulsory licenses for information pre-sui generis database protection have
been required under the competition rules in CJEU, Judgment of 6 April 1995 RTE, Joined
cases C-249/91 P and C-242/91 P, EU:C:1995:98.
265
BERNT P. HUGENHOLTZ, AGAINST ‘DATA PROPERTY’, IN KRITIKA: ESSAYS ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 48 (Peter Drahos ed., 2018).
266
Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of database, [1996] OJ L 77/20.
267
CJEU, Judgment of 1 March 2012 Football Dataco, C-604/10, EU:C:2012:115, para.
38.
268
In a series of case the CJE has limited the broad scope of the sui generis right to a
certain extent. In CJEU, Judgement of 9 November 2004 The British Horseracing Board and
Others, C-203/02, EU:C:2004:695 the Court excluded from the scope of protection databases
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innovation and research. Not only does a right granted for investing in the
collection of data fail to incentivize creativity and innovation, but it also
grants the investor control over this data in its specific collection. This
increase information and transaction costs, either because of the necessity to
obtain licenses for the use of databases, or because of lengthy litigation. 270
The absence of sufficiently broad and relevant exception to the right is also a
matter of concerns that should be addressed to enable downstreaminnovation. The Database Directive itself only foresees a mandatory
exception for lawful users to extract and re-utilize insubstantial parts of an
unoriginal database 271 and three optional exceptions for the purposes of
private use, illustration for teaching and scientific research and for the
purposes of public security. 272 Extending the applicability of general
copyright exceptions to original and non-original databases would be a first
step in the right direction. 273
Two reviews of the Database Directive 274 have not resulted in changes to
the current regime, and only recently, legislative proposal have suggested
minor changes to the sui generis right. The proposed Data Governance Act 275
takes an enabling approach to the use of data but remains firm on the
protection of databases under intellectual property law. However, it considers
that “[t]he idea that data that has been generated at the expense of public
budgets should benefit society has been part of Union policy for a long
time” 276 which is while in general the “[r]e-use of data shall only be allowed
in compliance with intellectual property rights” such rights should not be
exercised by public sector bodies. 277
The proposed Data Act 278 limits the applicability of the sui generis
database right by excluding databases “containing data obtained from or
generated by the use of a product or a related service.” 279 This exception,
according to the relevant recital means to enable “users to access and use data
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and the right to share data with third parties”. 280
The changes suggested by the two draft proposals will not address the
main problem of the database right, that is monopolizes information in
collected form if the rights in the database are held by private parties. Access
to such information, to such data, can be essential in driving innovative
products and services. The CJEU has recognized this in its recent ruling in
CV Online-Latvia when it “is necessary to strike a fair balance between, on
the one hand, the legitimate interest of the makers of databases in being able
to redeem their substantial investment and, on the other hand, that of users
and competitors of those makers in having access to the information
contained in those databases and the possibility of creating innovative
products based on that information.” 281 Here, the CJEU introduced
fundamental rights into the mix of considerations that a reshaped copyright
framework for databases should rely on. A right to research as an additional
argument that encapsulates not only utilitarian notions of added
competitiveness and innovation, but also reflects the long-term mission of the
European Union, could add critical weight on the balancing scales. It is for
the European legislator to cease this opportunity to steer European database
protection in the right direction. 282 This is particularly necessary because
database owners would be able to opt-out of the TDM exception of Article 4
CDSM Directive, which also applies to commercial research.
CONCLUSION
Research is a precondition to create a sustainable future. It is
indispensable to realize substantive and programmatic human and
fundamental rights, rights which inform global, European and national
policies and which take shape in concrete actions envisaged to create a more
sustainable global community. Copyright plays an important role in enabling
access to information to create in order to meet the ambitious goals set out,
for example, in EU policies and in the Sustainable Development Goals at
international level. A right to research, expressed as such, can help to realize
these goals by providing convincing arguments for copyright reform, but has
not been included expressly in international or European fundamental rights
instruments. Its pieces are, however, present in the canon of European and
international fundamental rights and which are an elementary part of the aims
and objectives of the Union.
As a result, a right to research as we propose is influenced by existing

280

Data Act, rec. 84.
CJEU, Judgment of 3 June 2021 CV-Online Latvia, C-762/19, EU:C:2021:434, para.
41. In striking this balance the CJEU adjusted the infringement test and now requires that for
an extraction or re-utilization to constitute and infringement under Article 7(1) Database
Directive it must be demonstrated that such use adversely affects the investment of the maker
of the database.
282
Derclaye & Husovec, supra (n 268), 330.
281

GEIGER/JÜTTE

61

CONCEPTUALIZING A RIGHT TO RESEARCH

concepts, interpretations and understandings present in the fundamental
rights of the ECHR and the CFREU, as well as international human rights
instruments, including the UCDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR. A right to
research as we construct is also rooted in the political mission of the
European Union and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals,
which establish political goals for which continued and persistent research
efforts are a precondition. A right to research is, therefore, conceived as a
constitutional imperative. Giving shape and express recognition to this right
under its own label will give better weight to research as a necessary policy
goal in political discourses and negotiations on the future shape of copyright
law. This mission is admittedly much broader than designing a sustainable
copyright system, but copyright plays an important part in building a
sustainable global future.
For copyright law, a right to research will serve two main functions: first,
it will inform legislatures when debating and (re-) drafting copyright law,
when creating, repealing and shaping exclusive rights and when designing
exceptions and limitations that permit uses necessary and indispensable for
research; second, it will inform the judiciary when applying copyright law in
the light of fundamental rights, a technique that is of paramount importance
in the Member States of the European Union.
The impact of a right to research will, of course, be much broader than a
simple corrective of existing copyright norms. It can, and we have argued that
it should, create a normative shift in copyright law towards a more
paradigmatic understanding of copyright as a system of rules that is intended
to promote and enable creativity and innovation for the benefit of society at
large. Designing or excavating a new (fundamental) right based on specific
policy considerations must inevitably shift the balance in normative systems
that rely on fundamental rights as guiding norms.
We have demonstrated that this shift would change copyright, interpreted
and understood in light of an ‘upgraded’ fundamental rights regime, into a
right that permits access to information if used for purposes that promote
copyright’s mission. Putting copyright in the service of our societal mission
and our normative goals will be the logical result of a right-to-researchinfused copyright regime.
In the coming decades, as the last years have demonstrated, the
importance of research for human development, and to a clear extent for
human survival, will depend on continuous and intensive research to face and
master the challenges we will face as a global society in a physically and
digitally interconnected world. A right to research can help to avoid that a
legal institution designed to enhance progress and access to science and
culture – copyright – does not stand in the way of the best possible sustainable
development of our global society.
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